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Legal Consciousness as Race Consciousness: Expansion 
of the Fourth Amendment Seizure Analysis Through 
Objective Knowledge of Police Impunity 
Lindsey Webb* 
Encounters between police officers and members of the community are 
deeply influenced by race.  Yet when courts assess whether police officers 
have complied with the Fourth Amendment, they explicitly exclude 
consideration of the ways in which racial bias, assumptions, and fear 
influence police-civilian interactions.  In determining whether law 
enforcement officers seized a civilian, for example, courts look to the 
objective circumstances of the event, such as the number of officers involved, 
whether police weapons were drawn, and the tone of voice the officers used.  
They then assess whether, under such circumstances, a reasonable person 
would feel free to refuse law enforcement requests or otherwise terminate 
the encounter.  Courts disregard the racial dynamics of the interaction as 
falling outside of the objective parameters of the seizure inquiry. 
This Article suggests a novel pathway to a racially conscious 
reasonable person standard that does not require courts to abandon their 
allegiance to objectivity.  This approach focuses attention on the assumption, 
already inherent to that inquiry, that a reasonable person is one with a 
knowledge of the controlling law.  A reasonable person is thus one with an 
understanding both of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the legal 
doctrine intended to deter or punish police misconduct, such as criminal and 
civil liability and the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence from criminal 
trials.  A reasonable person with such knowledge would understand that 
police officers are not meaningfully constrained in the moment and are not 
consistently held accountable by the law.  This approach would thus serve 
to shift the Fourth Amendment seizure analysis closer to racial realities by 
requiring courts to engage with the lack of police accountability as an issue 
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“And you now know, if you did not know before, that the police 
departments of your country have been endowed with the authority to destroy 
your body. . . . And destruction is merely the superlative form of a dominion 
whose prerogatives include friskings, detainings, beatings, and humiliations. 
All of this is common to black people. All of this is old for black people. No 
one is held responsible.” – Ta-Nehisi Coates, Between the World and Me.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Race and policing in the United States are inextricably intertwined.  
Organized law enforcement in this country has, among its historical roots, 
slave patrols conceived in the antebellum era to prevent enslaved people 
from escaping or otherwise rebelling.2  In the modern age, African American 
people are stopped, beaten, arrested, and shot by police officers in greater 
 
*Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, J.D., Stanford Law School, 
LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, B.A., Wesleyan University.   
 1  TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 9 (2015).   
 2  See Sandra Bass, Policing Space, Policing Race: Social Control Imperatives and 
Police Discretionary Decisions, 28 SOC. JUSTICE 156, 159 (2001) (“Although informal 
policing mechanisms began in the colonial period, the emergence of a semi-formal, organized 
policing force can be traced to slavery.”).   
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percentages than any other racial group.3  The names of African American 
men, women, and children killed in recent years by law enforcement—
Michael Brown, Charleena Lyles, Tamir Rice, Philando Castile4—have 
become an invocation and a rallying cry for police reform.5  Community 
members, advocates, and scholars describe, in stark and passionate terms, 
how racialized policing impacts Black lives,6 and references to the 
 
 3  According to one set of data, African American people are three times more likely to 
be killed by the police than are white people.  See MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, 
https://mappingpoliceviolence.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2017); see also FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING, WHEN POLICE KILL, 46–47 (2017) (noting that African Americans, Native 
Americans, and Asian Pacific Islanders are “overrepresented in the police killings 
distribution,” with African American people composing the “largest population group with 
outsized death tolls,” and noting that different data sources indicate that African American 
people are killed at either two or three times the rate “that would represent their current share 
of the U.S. population”); Center for Policing Equity, The Science of Justice: Race, Arrests, 
and Police Use of Force, at 15 (July 2016), http://policingequity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/CPE_SoJ_Race-Arrests-UoF_2016-07-08-1130.pdf (study finding 
that the use of all types of police force—from minor physical acts to dog bites to shootings—
is three times greater for African American people than for whites).   
 4  See Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-aft
er-police-shooting.html (describing the shooting of Michael Brown, an unarmed African 
American teenager, by a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri); Matthew Haag, Fatal 
Police Shooting of Seattle Woman Raises Mental Health Questions, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/us/seattle-police-shooting-charleena-lyles.html 
(describing the shooting death of Charleena Lyles, an African American woman, by two 
police officers in front of her young children); Abby Ohlheiser, Death of Tamir Rice, 12-Year-
Old Shot by Cleveland Police, Ruled a Homicide, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/12/12/death-of-tamir-rice-12-y
ear-old-shot-by-cleveland-police-ruled-a-homicide/?utm_term=.415cda469c71 (describing 
the shooting of Tamir Rice, a 12-year-old African American child, holding a toy gun, by a 
white police officer); Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando 
Castile, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-
shooting-trial-philando-castile.html (describing the killing of Philando Castile, an African 
American man, by a police officer in front of his girlfriend and young daughter).   
 5  For a reporter’s perspective on protests and activism following the police killings of 
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri; Tamir Rice in Cleveland, Ohio; and Freddie Gray in 
Baltimore, Maryland, among others, see WESLEY LOWERY, THEY CAN’T KILL US ALL: 
FERGUSON, BALTIMORE, AND A NEW ERA IN AMERICA’S RACIAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (2016).   
 6  See, e.g., MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, TEARS WE CANNOT STOP 27 (2017) (“I am sorely 
afraid that some snap of racist judgment—which, by now, means it will be justified as rational 
assessment under threatening circumstances, circumstances that our color always provokes—
will cause the hair trigger of some cop’s weapon to fire fury at my children.”); Teri A. 
McMurtry-Chubb, #SayHerName #BlackWomensLivesMatter: State Violence in Policing the 
Black Female Body, 67 MERCER L. REV. 651, 653 (2016) (“Black female bodies are regularly 
policed and eventually sorted in United States prisons in accordance with their material value 
to the State and their ability to threaten its foundations.”).  For a series of recollections by 
African American men—including Justice Thurgood Marshall, former Attorney General Eric 
Holder, and Professor Derrick Bell, among many other professionals—regarding racial 
profiling by the police and members of the public, see CHARLES J. OGLETREE, THE 
PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: THE ARREST OF HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR. AND RACE, CLASS AND 
CRIME IN AMERICA 115–241 (2010).   
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significance of race in police encounters can be found everywhere from 
poetry to popular culture.7  Whatever the complexities of the causes, it seems 
impossible to reasonably deny that contact between a police officer and a 
member of the community is deeply impacted by race.8 
Yet when courts analyze the constitutionality of the police power to 
engage, detain, and arrest civilians, they apply objective legal standards that 
explicitly exclude consideration of how racial9 bias, assumptions, and fear 
inform the interaction.  In determining whether a police officer has “seized” 
a civilian for Fourth Amendment purposes, courts evaluate whether a 
reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter with law 
enforcement under the circumstances of the contact.10  Courts look to the 
objective facts of the encounter, such as the number of officers involved, 
whether officers brandished weapons, and how police phrased their 
 
 7  Examples of references to police violence in popular culture and art are myriad. Such 
references include the image of Beyoncé sinking beneath the water on the top of a police 
cruiser in her Formation video, as well songs such as Jay-Z’s “Spiritual” (“Yeah, I am not 
poison/no I am not poison/Just a boy from the hood that/Got my hands in the air/In despair 
don’t shoot”). BEYONCÉ, LEMONADE (Parkwood Entm’t 2016); JAY-Z, Spiritual (single) 
(TIDAL 2016). KRS-One’s “Sound of Da Police” is an indictment of police violence (“The 
overseer had the right to get ill/And if you fought back, the overseer had the right to kill/The 
officer has the right to arrest/And if you fight back they put a hole in your chest”), as are 
poems such as Hakim Bellamy’s A.A. (Afro Anonymous) aka “In Recovery” aka WARdrobe 
(“When their life/or pride/is in danger/they cannot tell the difference between you/and the 
criminal record/they been bumping in their patrol car all day.”). KRS-ONE, Sound of Da 
Police, on RETURN OF THE BOOM BAP (Jive Records 1993); HAKIM BELLAMY, A.A. (AFRO 
ANONYMOUS) AKA “IN RECOVERY” AKA WARDROBE, https://hakimbe.bandcamp.com/track/a-
a-afro-anonymous-aka-in-recovery-aka-wardrobe.   
 8  Nevertheless, some do dispute a connection between race and police violence.  See, 
e.g., Philippe Lemoine, Police Violence against Black Men is Rare, NATIONAL REVIEW (Sept. 
18, 2017), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/451466/police-violence-against-black-
men-rare-heres-what-data-actually-say (arguing that police violence against black men is 
rare, and any racial discrepancies in the rate of such violence is attributable to black males 
committing more violent crimes); but see Kia Makarechi, What the Data Really Says About 
Police and Racial Bias, VANITY FAIR (July 14, 2016), https://www.vanityfair.com
/news/2016/07/data-police-racial-bias (drawing findings from “academic studies, legal 
rulings, and media investigations” regarding how race impacts civilian encounters with the 
police).   
 9  This Article focuses on how Fourth Amendment seizure analysis fails to consider 
issues of race, but the conclusions could apply in many ways to other identities that impact 
police-civilian interactions, including gender, sexual orientation, age, and disability status.  
See, e.g., NORM STAMPER, TO PROTECT AND SERVE: HOW TO FIX AMERICA’S POLICE 45–66 
(2016) (discussing the impact of mental illness, both that of community members and of 
police officers, in interactions between civilians and police); McMurtry-Chubb, supra note 6 
(discussing the history of the impact of policing on Black women from slavery until the 
present day).   
 10  United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“[A] person has been ‘seized’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave.”).   
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questions, and gauge how such circumstances would impact a hypothetical 
reasonable person.11  The feelings, knowledge, and background of the actual 
person involved are not considered.  The racial dynamics of the interaction, 
which can require analysis of psychology, history, culture, and the civilian’s 
personal experiences, are also disregarded as falling outside of the objective 
parameters of the inquiry. 
Critics have long argued that the “objective” approach to the seizure 
inquiry requires courts to view police encounters with civilians through a 
lens cleansed of social context, one that claims to be race-neutral by 
resolutely avoiding engagement with race altogether.12  Yet the significant 
scholarship, advocacy, and public outcry against racially disparate patterns 
of police violence have not influenced courts to broaden the factors they 
consider when applying the reasonable person test in the context of Fourth 
Amendment seizure analysis.  This Article seeks to contribute to the 
arguments for a race-focused and racially realistic seizure doctrine by 
suggesting a pathway to an expanded legal analysis of the reasonable person 
standard that does not require courts to abandon allegiance to objectivity.  
 
 11  Id. (citations omitted) (“Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even 
where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several 
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the 
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s 
request might be compelled.”).   
 12  See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 340 
(1998) (“Although the casual reader of the Court’s Fourth Amendment opinions would never 
know it, race matters when measuring the dynamics and legitimacy of certain police-citizen 
encounters. Indeed, in light of past and present tensions between the police and minority 
groups, it is startling that the Court would ignore racial concerns when formulating 
constitutional rules that control police discretion to search and seize persons on the street.”); 
Devon Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 968 (2002) 
(“[T]he racial effects of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment law is a function of the 
Court’s adoption of what I call the perpetrator perspective. Two normative and race-
constructing commitments underwrite this perspective: (1) the notion that how people interact 
with and respond to the police is neither affected by nor mediated through race; and (2) the 
idea that whether and how the police engage people is not a function of race. As a result of 
these commitments, the Court conceptualizes race primarily through the racial lens of 
colorblindness. In this sense, the race and Fourth Amendment problem is not just a function 
of the fact that the Court ignores race. It is also, and perhaps more fundamentally, a function 
of the Court’s underlying investment in a particular conception of race: race neutrality or 
colorblindness.”); Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems 
of Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 570 (1998) (arguing 
that Whren and other Supreme Court rulings have established that “[a]s long as there is an 
objective basis on which the officer could have formed the requisite reasonable suspicion” to 
conduct a stop,  “it would seem to be almost impossible for a suspect to present evidence that 
racial bias infected the officer’s thinking, even if the allegation is true.”); Paul Butler, The 
White Fourth Amendment,  43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 245, 247 (2010) (“The Fourth Amendment 
accomplishes its racial project in three parts. First, the jurisprudence rarely mentions race. 
Next, it grants extraordinary discretion to police and prosecutors. Finally, it constructs the 
criminal as colored, and the white as innocent.”).   
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This approach focuses attention on the assumption, already inherent to the 
reasonable person inquiry, that a reasonable person is one with a knowledge 
of the controlling law.  This Article argues that courts determining whether 
a reasonable person would feel free to ignore the police or end a police 
encounter should consider the civilian’s presumptive knowledge of the law 
as an objective factor.  A reasonable person is thus one with an understanding 
both of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the legal doctrine intended to 
deter or punish police misconduct, such as criminal and civil liability and the 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence from criminal trials.  A reasonable 
person knows her constitutional rights and the remedies available if those 
rights are infringed—as do the police officers with whom she is engaged.13 
If a reasonable person weighing her freedom to terminate a police 
encounter is presumed to be cognizant of the legal standards applied to police 
misconduct, this presumption could expand judicial conceptions of seizure 
without taking on the additional burden of dismantling the objective 
standard.  Under the current objective standard analysis, courts do not ask 
whether a particular person’s experiences with the police or knowledge of 
data regarding race and police misconduct affected the individual’s freedom 
to terminate a police encounter.  But if courts focus on the reasonable 
person’s objective knowledge of the relevant law, they must consider 
whether that reasonable person should feel free to disregard a police officer’s 
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter if the legal system doesn’t 
serve to meaningfully control police misconduct.  In doing so, courts must 
explore whether a reasonable person is only free to terminate a police 
encounter if she is willing to ignore or absorb the risk of police lawbreaking 
when asserting her constitutional rights.  Courts may less easily disregard 
that question as the subjective concern of individual people of color if it is 
derived from the neutral, reasonable person’s knowledge of the applicable 
law. 
This approach does not seek to promote the “objective” reasonable 
person standard as an unalloyed good in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
Nor does it seek to deny the reality that African American people and other 
people of color are disproportionately the target of police contact and 
violence.  It instead meets courts where they are in the seizure analysis: 
 
 13  Courts have championed the connection between legal rights and remedies since 
Marbury v. Madison (“The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a 
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if 
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right”), and the significance of 
legal remedies to the enforcement of rights has been consistently championed by legal realists. 
5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).  See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT 
PERMISSION 77–78 (2017) (“In the eyes of many, a right without any remedy is no right at 
all . . . . The story of the Supreme Court’s failure to regulate the police is as much about the 
remedies as the rights themselves.”).   
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unwilling to move beyond a reasonable person standard stripped of racial 
considerations, but also committed to the presumption that ordinary people 
have a working knowledge of the law and its consequences.14  In doing so, 
this approach explores whether it is possible to move the reasonable person 
analysis towards race-consciousness by assuming objective knowledge of 
the state of the relevant law. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part One outlines the legal 
standards applied to police officers and community members in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence related to law enforcement seizures.  This Part 
explores the reasonable police officer inquiry and notes the ways in which 
this objective analysis arguably incorporates the individual officer’s 
subjective viewpoint through consideration of his training and experience.  
It also reviews the more rigid approach to objectivism in the reasonable 
person standard, and explains how both standards avoid consideration of the 
impact of race in police-civilian interactions.  Part Two addresses one largely 
unexplored aspect of the reasonable person analysis in the Fourth 
Amendment seizure context: the presumption that civilians and police 
possess knowledge of the law governing police-civilian encounters.  This 
Part argues that courts should thus also presume that the reasonable person 
interacting with the police has a knowledge of the law that serves to deter or 
punish police misconduct, and outlines the relevant areas of that law.  Part 
Three explores the implications to the Fourth Amendment seizure inquiry if 
courts recognize a reasonable person as one with the knowledge that police 
officers are not meaningfully constrained in the moment and are not 
consistently held accountable by the law.  This Part argues that this approach 
could serve to shift the analysis of Fourth Amendment seizure 
determinations closer to racial realities.  This Part also addresses possible 
critiques of this approach, including whether a reasonable person standard 
grounded in legal realism would have meaningful impact if Fourth 
Amendment remedies are so difficult to obtain. 
 
 14  This Article considers the implications to the Fourth Amendment seizure analysis of a 
reasonable person’s knowledge of the law applied to police misconduct.  It acknowledges, 
however, that there could be a range of objective knowledge that might impact the reasonable 
person analysis.  For example, a reasonable person could be one who is aware of the data 
regarding suspected or confirmed police wrongdoing (such as the number of violent acts 
committed by police each year) along with knowledge of the data regarding consequences of 
such wrongdoing (such as the number of convictions obtained, the percentage of police 
officers who are indemnified against damages claims, or the percentage of officers who lose 
their jobs following confirmed acts of misconduct).  While this approach to the objective 
knowledge standard is beyond the scope of this Article, objective knowledge of varied sorts 
beyond those currently represented in the reasonable person standard could also play a part in 
altering that standard in some of the ways suggested herein.   
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I. THE RACE-AVOIDANT FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURE ANALYSIS 
The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches 
and seizures performed by government agents.15  Fourth Amendment 
doctrine is thus focused on determining when government actors have 
“seized” or “searched” persons or their property, when they are 
constitutionally permitted to do so, and what consequences should apply if 
government agents act outside the scope of those constitutional parameters.  
This Part will provide an overview of the ways in which shifting judicial 
interpretations of reasonableness and objectivity in the seizure context has 
created a jurisprudence in which race is almost entirely ignored. 
A. Reasonable Police Officers and Seizure of Persons 
When a law enforcement officer “seizes” a civilian, the encounter 
crosses a constitutional dividing line.  A police officer can approach and 
engage with a person for any reason, or for no reason whatsoever, without 
implicating the Fourth Amendment; only if the officer has conducted a 
seizure of the person does the Fourth Amendment apply.16  In order to 
determine when a “casual encounter” morphs into a seizure, courts ask 
whether a reasonable person in the same circumstances would feel free to 
decline requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.17  As discussed below, 
this analysis has created a muddled doctrine that makes it difficult to identify 
the line between consensual encounter and police seizure; once a court has 
determined that such a shift occurred, however, the police must have 
justification for the seizure that satisfies Fourth Amendment standards. 
While the text of the Fourth Amendment appears to demand that 
officers have probable cause to carry out a seizure—a conclusion echoed in 
judicial opinions for decades18—current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
instead asserts that the level of justification required depends on whether the 
encounter is an investigatory stop or an arrest.  Since the 1968 Supreme 
Court decision in Terry v. Ohio, officers have been permitted to temporarily 
 
 15  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).   
 16  See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (explaining that “law enforcement 
officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the 
street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by 
putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a 
criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions.”).   
 17  United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).   
 18  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (citations omitted) (“We do not retreat from 
our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of 
searches and seizures through the warrant procedure . . . or that in most instances failure to 
comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent circumstances.”).   
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seize a person for investigative purposes without violating the Fourth 
Amendment if the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the 
individual is involved in criminal behavior.19  Reasonable and articulable 
suspicion only justifies investigative stops; officers may go further and 
conduct an arrest only if they have probable cause to believe that the person 
has committed or is in the process of committing a crime.20 
In evaluating whether the officer was constitutionally justified in 
making the stop or arrest, courts undertake an objective inquiry as to whether 
the factual circumstances of which the officer was aware constituted 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe a crime had occurred or 
was in progress.21  The universe of facts relevant to this analysis is broad.  
Police officers may draw upon sources of information well beyond their own 
observations, including information known by other officers22 and general 
knowledge of criminal activity and neighborhood crime rates gleaned from 
the officer’s time on the force.23  Officers can even rely on information that 
is factually wrong, such as the existence of a warrant or a misleading 
description of a suspect, without violating the Fourth Amendment, so long 
as the reliance is reasonable.24  The universe of objective facts is not 
 
 19  Id. at 28 (stating that the officer can also go further and conduct a “frisk” of the seized 
person to search for weapons if “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances, would be 
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger”).  Although Terry and 
its progeny treat the temporary seizure and the limited weapons search as two separate acts 
with separate reasonableness requirements, officers conduct the two together so routinely that 
police encounters with civilians under Terry are generally referred to as “stop and frisks.”  Id. 
at 12.   
 20  Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (citations omitted) (stating the existence of 
probable cause depends on “whether, at the moment the [warrantless] arrest was made . . .  the 
facts and circumstances within [the arresting officer’s] knowledge and of which [the arresting 
officer] had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the [arrestee] had committed or was committing an offense”).   
 21  Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (concluding courts must assess 
whether the “historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police 
officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause”).   
 22  United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 230–32 (1985) (concluding that an officer can 
rely on a wanted-person flyer issued by another police department so long as the original 
department had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop).   
 23  See Kit Kinports, Veteran Police Officers and Three-Dollar Steaks: The 
Subjective/Objective Dimensions of Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 751, 755–56 (2010) (discussing Supreme Court case law that establishes that “the 
quantum of suspicion arising from a particular set of facts may vary depending on what a 
police officer knew based on her training, experience, and familiarity with the 
neighborhood”).   
 24  Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (“The Constitution is no more violated 
when officers enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe 
that the person who has consented to their entry is a resident of the premises, than it is violated 
when they enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe they 
are in pursuit of a violent felon who is about to escape.”).   
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unlimited, however; courts evaluating the constitutionality of police seizures 
do not take into consideration some arguably relevant facts of which officers 
should also be aware, such as the significance of the race of the person seized 
(unless the defendant’s race is part of a suspect description that contributed 
to the seizure) or data about disparate stop and arrest rates of people of color 
in the area of the seizure.25 
Despite avowed commitment to the objectivity of the reasonable 
suspicion and probable standards, judicial analysis frequently strays beyond 
a basic inquiry as to whether the facts of the situation at hand were sufficient 
to provide a hypothetical reasonable officer with reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause.  Courts regularly credit officer training and experience, for 
example, as providing law enforcement officials with insight into the 
criminal significance of the manner in which a person is dressed, walking, 
standing, talking, or driving.26  Courts also cite such training and experience 
in support of officers’ assertions that an area has a high level of criminal 
activity, and that the high-crime context casts criminal suspicion on behavior 
that might appear benign to others, such as a man running27  or a group of 
teens hanging out on a corner.28  So deferential are courts to the inherent 
credibility of officer assessment of civilian behavior that judges assessing 
seizures rarely require the government to produce empirical evidence to 
support the officer’s interpretation of the factual circumstances at issue.29  
Instead, they defer to officer’s background and experience, even when 
referenced in general terms, as a source of law enforcement expertise.30 
 
 25  See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79, 82 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that “the 
color of a person’s skin, be it black or white, is an identifying factor which, while insufficient 
by itself, assists the police in narrowing the scope of their identification procedure”).   
 26  See, e.g., United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 61 (2d Cir. 1977) (citation omitted) 
(stating courts must evaluate whether the facts supported reasonable suspicion “through the 
eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and 
training”).   
 27  See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 122, 124–25 (2000) (holding that officers 
possessed reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct a stop when Mr. Wardlow fled from 
the police in a high-crime area).   
 28  See, e.g., Oates, 560 F.2d at 61 (“Thus, it may well be that some patterns of behavior 
which may seem innocuous enough to the untrained eye may not appear so innocent to the 
trained police officer who has witnessed similar scenarios numerous times before.”).   
 29  Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
1995, 2078 (2017) (“From suppression hearings to the analysis of vague laws, judges have 
repeatedly embraced police judgment in scenarios that raise significant empirical or doctrinal 
concerns, the repercussions of which they neither address nor attempt to justify.”).   
 30  See Eric J. Miller, Detective Fiction: Race, Authority, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 213, 227 (2012) (contending that, when analyzing police officer determinations 
of probable cause and reasonable suspicion, “the Court repeats like a mantra the importance 
of officer training and experienceFalsePolice training and experience thus establishes the 
police as craftsmen members of a specialized guild, one that the Court has granted something 
of a monopoly on evaluating the significance of crimnogenic evidence. The rest of us, 
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Some courts and commentators have concluded that the officer’s 
training and experience is simply another objective factor for the court to 
consider, while others have characterized this information as a subjective 
lens through which the facts of the encounter are evaluated.31  This may be a 
distinction without a practical difference; in whatever way it is described, it 
is clear that courts are willing to enter the minds of the police officers 
involved at least to the extent of incorporating consideration of their 
professional backgrounds. 
Judicial willingness to take into consideration the unique perspective of 
the police officer does not extend, however, to examination of the officer’s 
motivations for conducting the seizure.  In Whren v. United States, the 
Supreme Court held that even when it is clear that an officer seized a person 
for a constitutionally impermissible reason, such as racial animus, that 
improper subjective impetus does not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
violation so long as other, permissible factors existed to justify the stop.32  
The fact that the officer in question did not rely on those neutral factors, but 
instead was motivated by personal hostility toward people of color, is thus 
irrelevant if objective facts existed that would give a reasonable officer a 
permissible reason to conduct the seizure.33 
 
including the judiciary, lack this specialized guild knowledge and so should defer to the on-
the-street judgments of police experts.”); see, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275-
276 (2002) (holding that a border patrol agent’s “specialized training and familiarity with the 
customs of the area’s inhabitants” provided the officer with reasonable suspicion to believe 
that a passing driver’s “slowing down, stiffening of posture, and failure to acknowledge a 
sighted law enforcement officer” indicated that the driver was engaged in criminal activity).   
 31  See Kinports, supra note 23, at 757 (describing the conflict between state and federal 
courts that rely on “the officer’s training and experience as independent factors supporting the 
existence of probable cause and reasonable suspicion,” and courts that “take the position that 
the facts purportedly giving rise to probable cause are to be evaluated from the perspective of 
someone with the particular officer’s training and experience”).   
 32  517 U.S. 806, 814–15 (1996).   
 33  The Supreme Court’s “colorblind” rulings have been widely critiqued.  For example, 
Professor Ian Haney López has argued that in Supreme Court case law, “[t]he colorblind 
conceptions of race and racism function similarly: both exist only when mentioned . . . . This 
magic-word formalism strips race and racism of all social meaning and of any connection to 
social practices of group conflict and subordination.”  IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: 
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 160–61 (2006).  The approach adopted by the Court in 
Whren takes the Court’s colorblindness even further, concluding that even when government 
actions are explicitly motivated by race, “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, 
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” 517 U.S. at 813.  This approach is echoed in 
cases such as Batson v. Kentucky, in which the Court held that prosecutors may rebut a prima 
facie showing that they exercised preemptory challenges of jurors in a racially discriminatory 
way by putting forth a “neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.” 476 U.S. 79, 96–97 
(1986).  So long as a ‘race-neutral’ explanation for a discriminatory action exists, the 
discrimination itself will be ignored.  See Mia Carpiniello, Note, Striking a Sincere Balance: 
A Reasonable Black Person Standard for “Location Plus Evasion” Terry Stops, 6 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 355, 365 (2001) (“As long as the police officer offers some race-neutral reason for 
the stop, other reasons can act as proxies for race.”).   
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It is difficult to discern a clear organizing principle within Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence analyzing reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause.  Courts will consider the perspective of the police officer when it 
comes to professional training and experience, but not when those 
perspectives involve personal bias.  An officer may be aware of many facts 
regarding a particular encounter; courts will view some of these facts as 
significant to the reasonable suspicion and probable cause analysis, and 
others as largely irrelevant.  Critics of this disparity argue that it can be 
explained by judicial deference to governmental objectives, so that 
information that bolsters justification for the seizure is validated, but that 
which undermines the integrity of the stop or arrest is ignored.34  In this way, 
the reasonable officer analysis in the seizure context shares commonalities 
with other areas of law addressing police actions, which, as discussed further 
below, are designed to provide ample room for deference to police decision-
making.35  Whatever the motivations behind the shifting analytical 
framework, it serves to almost entirely exclude considerations of the ways 
that racial bias and fear implicate police-civilian interactions when courts 
review the constitutionality of civilian seizures by law enforcement.36 
B. Reasonable Persons and Seizures by Police 
Of course, courts only engage in an analysis of whether an officer had 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify a seizure of a person if such 
seizure—a stop or an arrest—has actually occurred.  As noted previously, 
law enforcement officers have seized a person under the Fourth Amendment 
if a reasonable person in the same circumstances would not feel free to deny 
the officer’s requests or to otherwise terminate the encounter.37  The 
 
 34  See, e.g., Lauryn P. Gouldin, Redefining Reasonable Seizures, 93 DENV. L. REV. 53, 
61 (2015) (noting that since the turn of this century, the Supreme Court has issued decisions 
that “have broadly expanded the government’s power to seize people.  In twenty-two of . . . 
twenty-eight cases [regarding seizure], the Court ruled in favor of the government, solidifying 
existing seizure authority and expanding the government’s ability to arrest, stop, or otherwise 
detain individuals”).   
 35  See infra Part II for a description of doctrines, including qualified immunity and 
justifiable force, that privilege the perspective of the police. 
 36  The courts are not alone in failing to consider the impact of race in police-civilian 
encounters.  Police officers and representatives for the police department routinely state that 
law enforcement actions are not motivated by race.  As former officer and police chief Norm 
Stamper explains, “Most police officers would have us believe they are officially colorblind 
(as if observing racial and cultural differences is a bad thing) they make their decisions based 
strictly on the ‘facts.’ Context doesn’t matter. History doesn’t matter. The preexisting 
relationship between cops and communities doesn’t matter. White cops’ inordinate fear of 
black men doesn’t matter.”  NORM STAMPER, TO PROTECT AND SERVE: HOW TO FIX AMERICA’S 
POLICE 131 (2016).   
 37  United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 
429, 436 (1991) (stating that in determining whether a police encounter is a seizure, “the 
WEBB (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2018  5:14 PM 
2018] LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS RACE CONSCIOUSNESS 415 
reasonable person inquiry, like the reasonable suspicion and probable cause 
analyses, is an objective one.38  When determining whether a reasonable 
person would feel free to refuse an officer or leave the encounter, however, 
courts have a stricter interpretation of the “objective” approach than when 
examining whether officers had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to 
justify a stop or arrest.  Courts consider a more limited universe of facts from 
which the reasonable person can draw constitutional conclusions, and do not 
factor in the personal history and knowledge of the person involved in the 
police encounter.39  As with the reasonable suspicion and probable cause 
inquiry, the reasonable person analysis disregards the racial dynamics of the 
interaction.40 
While police officers may rely on an array of information beyond their 
own observations when making stop and arrest determinations, courts 
determining whether a reasonable person would feel free to end a police 
encounter focus more narrowly on the circumstances of the encounter itself.  
With the exception of certain limited circumstances that generally are 
understood to constitute a seizure—such as police physically restraining an 
individual41—courts look to the observable facts of the interaction and ask 
how those circumstances would affect a reasonable person in the abstract.42  
Courts consider a wide variety of factors in making this determination, 
including whether officers drew their weapons, spoke quietly or loudly, or 
actively prevented the community member from walking away.43 
 
appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ 
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter”).   
 38  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.   
 39  Jesse-Justin Cuevas & Tonja Jacobi, The Hidden Psychology of Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2192-93 (2016) (stating that courts applying 
the Fourth Amendment reasonable person analysis in the seizure context “ordinarily neglect 
to evaluate any of the suspect’s subjective characteristics.”).   
 40  A recent, and notable, exception to judicial avoidance of race when conducting seizure 
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530, 539-40 
(2016), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that, while flight is a factor in 
reasonable suspicion analysis, “where the suspect is a black male stopped by the police on the 
streets of Boston, the analysis of flight as a factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus cannot 
be divorced from the findings in a recent Boston Police Department (department) report 
documenting a pattern of racial profiling of black males in the city of Boston.”   
 41  See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 637–38 (1991) (seizure requires physical 
force or submission to a show of authority).   
 42  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; see, e.g., United States v. Stover, 808 F.3d 991, 995 (4th 
Cir. 2005) (describing the Mendenhall “free to leave” standard as an “objective test”).   
 43  Mendenhall, supra note 10, at 554 (“We conclude that a person has been ‘seized’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not 
attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon 
by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or 
tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.”).   
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The line between a consensual encounter and a seizure is not always 
easy to discern.  For example, courts have held that civilians would feel free 
to refuse an officer’s requests or otherwise terminate the police encounter 
when armed police officers entered a cross-state bus and questioned the 
passengers;44 when police officers stopped a man and took his driver’s 
license;45 and when three police officers approached a man and stated, “[we 
are] here for your marijuana plants.”46  In making these determinations, 
courts do not consider the racial identities of the officers and the community 
member, nor do they consider data about how those dynamics might impact 
the interaction. Courts do not even consider information about recent high-
profile accounts of police misconduct in the area that might play a role in a 
reasonable person’s assessment of her ability to exit the interaction without 
consequence. 
Further, in the reasonable person analysis, courts do not consider the 
civilian’s individualized perspective of the circumstances of the encounter, 
nor do they credit the personal education or experiences of the civilian as 
relevant to her understanding of the significance of law enforcement words 
or actions.  Courts do not defer to civilian expertise on police conduct gained 
through personal experience and education in the way that they credit police 
with expertise regarding criminal behavior in the community.  Because the 
judicial portrait of a reasonable person is stripped of identities such as age, 
race, gender, or disability status, it is consequently devoid of the perspective 
on policing that a person with these particular characteristics might possess.  
A person’s knowledge of the history of police-civilian interactions in a 
particular neighborhood, such as the experiences of an African American 
person who has had multiple encounters with local law enforcement, is thus 
beyond the scope of the reasonable person analysis.  Rather than take any of 
this information into account, courts arguably reach conclusions about the 
impact of the circumstances of the police encounter on the objective 
‘reasonable person’ based on the judge’s own experiences, instincts, and 
imagination.47 
 
 44  See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439–40; United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203 (2002).   
 45  United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 311–12 (4th Cir. 2002).   
 46  United States v. Jones, 701 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 2012).   
 47  Desiree Phair, Comment, Searching for the Appropriate Standard: Stops, Seizure, and 
the Reasonable Person’s Willingness to Walk Away from the Police, 92 WASH. L. REV. 425, 
430 (2017) (describing judicial reliance on “instincts regarding what members of the public 
consider reasonable and when an average individual feels seized”); Janice Nadler, No Need 
to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 155-56 (2002) 
(“[T]he existing empirical evidence . . . suggests that observers outside of the situation 
systematically overestimate the extent to which citizens in police encounters feel free to 
refuse. Members of the Court are themselves such outside observers, and this partly explains 
why the Court repeatedly has held that police-citizen encounters are consensual and that 
consent to search was freely given.”).   
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The internal contradictions within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
surrounding seizures—among them the fact that courts consider the personal 
perspective of police officers, but only certain aspects of that perspective, 
and ignore the individual perspective of civilians entirely—cannot be 
reasonably explained by neutral legal concepts like the commitment to 
objectivity.  These contradictions make more sense, however, if they are 
understood to arise from a judicial desire to avoid confronting the 
complexities of race48 in the seizure analysis.  The pursuit of a ‘race-neutral’ 
seizure analysis has resulted in a jurisprudence willing to contort itself to 
avoid meaningful engagement with race and its impact on the encounter.  
This approach has been critiqued as a constitutional analysis framed as a 
“real world behavioral construct”49 that works, in reality, as a legal fiction.50 
C. Scholarly Attention to the Incorporation of Race in the Seizure 
Analysis 
Scholars and advocates have widely critiqued the race-avoidant nature 
of the Fourth Amendment seizure standards.  When relationships between 
the police and community members are so deeply affected by race, critics 
argue, judicial analyses that depict encounters between members of both 
groups as a featureless shadow play are not only inaccurate and incomplete, 
they can both mask and perpetuate the social inequalities they are choosing 
to ignore.51  Police stops motivated by race are condoned, and people of color 
 
 48  And, as noted previously, other social identities such as age, gender, and sexual 
orientation.  See, e.g., David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth 
Amendment’s Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 51, 53, 81–88 (2009) 
(explaining study results demonstrating that a person’s age and gender impact whether she 
feels free to terminate a police encounter).   
 49  Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality, 
Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38 SAN. 
DIEGO L. REV. 507, 510 (2001).   
 50  Josephine Ross, Can Social Science Defeat a Legal Fiction? Challenging Unlawful 
Stops Under the Fourth Amendment, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 315, 324–
25 (2012) (stating that “[f]rom its inception in Mendenhall, the free-to leave test was a legal 
fiction crafted in order to permit some police seizures to fall outside the Fourth Amendment, 
and therefore to allow police some latitude to stop and detain without cause”).   
 51  See, e.g., Carbado, supra note 12, at 1002–03 (“To the extent that the application of 
the free-to-leave test avoids this racial difference, masks it, or both, it legitimizes racial 
asymmetries in people’s vulnerability to and perceptions of police authority. In other words, 
eliding the ways in which race structures how people interact with and respond to the police 
leaves people of color in a worse constitutional position than whites.”); Carpiniello, supra 
note 33, at 369 (“The Court’s limited recognition of race as central only when race is explicitly 
identified as the sole factor in a decision to stop invites the use of racial proxies and prohibits 
the Court from challenging the use of race as a proxy for criminality. By refusing to 
acknowledge the constant forces of racial discrimination, the Court actually reinforces 
existing informal racism. The Court reinforces the existing White majority perception that 
racism is anomalous in Fourth Amendment law.”).   
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who do not feel free to ignore police requests have no method by which they 
can prove their fears are reasonable.52  The larger societal and structural 
forces that implicate officers’ decisions to contact, stop, arrest, and use force 
against people of color are disregarded in favor of highly fact-focused 
inquiries scrubbed clean of cultural or racial context. 
In response to these concerns, critics have proposed new approaches to 
the seizure analysis that would require courts to explicitly incorporate racial 
considerations.53  Scholars and advocates have argued, for example, that 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations should include the 
recognition that police officers are influenced by societal depictions of 
African American people as violent or prone to criminality.54  Courts would 
thus inquire into how implicit and explicit biases that arise from exposure to 
societal depictions of African Americans impact police as they engage with 
the public.55  Others argue that the reasonable person standard should 
recognize that African American people are subjected to police violence at a 
rate far exceeding their percentage of the population, and acknowledge the 
ways in which fear of such violence could reasonably impact an individual’s 
assessment of her freedom to terminate a police encounter.56  In pursuit of 
 
 52  See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-On-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some 
of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1498 (2016) (“[M]embers of vulnerable groups are 
impossible witnesses to their own victimization . . . .”).   
 53  See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—Some Preliminary Thoughts 
About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 250 (1991) 
(arguing that courts should consider race when determining whether a police-civilian 
interaction was coercive); Carpiniello, supra note 33, at 356–57 (proposing that in cases in 
which reasonable suspicion is based on flight, that suspicion should be assessed through 
consideration of the race of the suspect); but see Kathryne M. Young & Christin L. Munsch, 
Fact and Fiction in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 66 S.C. L. REV. 445, 486 (2014) 
(rejecting the inclusion of factors such as race, age, or gender into the seizure analysis, because 
courts would be bogged down in determining “the difference between a ‘reasonable’ young, 
poor Asian man whose parents went to Yale, and a ‘reasonable’ elderly, wealthy Latina whose 
parents did not graduate from high school,” and because this approach appears to concede 
social inequities rather than seek to remedy them).   
 54  See Carbado, supra note 52, at 1495–97, 1513–17 (describing empirical research 
exposing the association between blackness and criminality, such that “[n]ot only does seeing 
a black person arouse suspicions of criminality, but thinking about criminality brings to mind 
the image of a black person. This finding suggests that, even absent evidence of racial animus 
or explicitly held stereotypes, the formally race-neutral project of crime prevention and 
detection is already racially inflected,” and going on to discuss the role of police training and 
culture in fostering police violence).   
 55  See, e.g., Carbado, supra note 12, at 977 (discussing the impact of associations 
between criminality and race in police officer decision-making, such as an officer choosing 
to stop a group of African American people rather than a group of white people because of a 
belief that “between the two groups, there is a greater likelihood that the group of black men 
is involved in crime,” thus increasing the vulnerability of African American people to police 
encounters).   
 56  See Maclin, supra note 53, at 249–59 (discussing police violence against African 
American people and how this history can influence African American people to submit to 
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centering the reasonable person analysis on racial realities, scholars have 
also sought to contextualize police-civilian interactions in the modern age 
within the racialized history of policing in the United States.  They have, 
among other approaches, called for a reasonable person standard that takes 
into account the race of the seized person and how that race impacts the 
nature of the police-civilian encounter,57 and advocated for recognizing the 
influence of race and gender roles in interactions between civilians and 
police.58 
These suggestions have not thus far altered judicial approaches to 
Fourth Amendment seizure analysis.  Nor has that analysis been affected by 
the recent increase in social media and news media attention, spurred by 
highly publicized incidents of police violence against people of color, to the 
impact that race has on police decision-making and civilian views of law 
enforcement.59  Widely-circulated videos of police officers shooting and 
beating African American people60, and social movements such as Black 
 
police requests); see Commonwealth v. Warren, supra note 40, for an example of a case in 
which the court adopted this type of analysis.   
 57  See, e.g., Carbado, supra note 12, at 1000–04; Maclin, supra note 53, at 250; Graham 
Cronogue, Note, Race and the Fourth Amendment: Why the Reasonable Person Analysis 
Should Include Race as a Factor, 20 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 55, 58 (2015) (arguing that a 
person’s race has a “real and profound effect” on interactions between police officers and 
civilians).   
 58  See Eric J. Miller, Police Encounters with Race and Gender, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 
735, 738 (2015) (stating that “the republican idea that citizens can actively contest police 
actions is currently the least likely to work for women and people of color. In particular, it is 
precisely the act of asserting political standing that is likely to trigger police escalation and 
hostility against these groups.”).   
 59  See The Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research, Law 
Enforcement and Violence: The Divide between Black and White Americans, 
http://www.apnorc.org/projects/Pages/HTML%20Reports/law-enforcement-and-violence-th
e-divide-between-black-and-white-americans0803-9759.aspx (discussing racial differences 
in perceptions of the severity and frequency of police violence; for example, the study 
revealed that “85 percent of blacks think police are more likely to use force against a black 
person in most communities, compared with 63 percent of Hispanics and 39 percent of 
whites”); Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of 
Force 3-7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22399, 2016), 
www.nber.org/papers/w22399.pdf (analyzing data regarding race and police use of force, and 
concluding, among other findings, that “blacks and Hispanics are more than fifty percent more 
likely to have an interaction with the police which involves any use of force,” and “blacks are 
21 percent more likely than whites to be involved in an interaction with police in which at 
least a weapon is drawn”); Katie Nodjimbadem, The Long, Painful History of Police Brutality 
in the U.S., SMITHSONIAN, July 27, 2017, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-
institution/long-painful-history-police-brutality-in-the-us-180964098/ (“Today, live 
streaming, tweets and Facebook posts have blasted the incidents of police brutality, beyond 
the black community and into the mainstream media.”); Jay Caspian Kang, Our Demand is 
Simple: Stop Killing Us, N.Y. Times, May 4, 2015 (describing the use of social media by 
African American people to build a movement against police brutality).   
 60  Mercy Benzaquen, Damien Cave, & Rochelle Oliver, The Raw Videos That Have 
Sparked Outrage Over Police Treatment of Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, updated Dec. 17, 2017 
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Lives Matter and #SayHerName,61 which address the fact that African 
American people comprise a widely disproportionate percentage of persons 
stopped, arrested, and harmed at the hands of the police, have had little 
impact on judicial assessments of police seizures of civilians.62  Fourth 
Amendment seizure analysis remains resolutely immune to meaningful 
engagement with racial realities. 
II. LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SEIZURE ANALYSIS 
This Article suggests an additional way in which advocates might move 
courts towards increased racial realism, an approach that works within the 
current Fourth Amendment seizure standards.63  By focusing on one aspect 
of those standards—the assumption that civilians and police have both 
knowledge of the law and its application—courts could be pushed towards 
an analysis that better reflects racial realities in police-civilian encounters 
without altering the framework of the seizure analysis which courts appear 
disinclined to abandon.  After first discussing the role that the presumption 
of legal consciousness plays in the seizure analysis and our justice system as 
a whole, this Part will provide an overview of the areas of the law 
surrounding police misconduct that might serve as objective factors in the 







(compiling videos of acts of police violence against African American people).   
 61  See Black Lives Matter, http://art.blacklivesmatter.com/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2017) 
(discussing the history and principles of the Black Lives Matter movement); #SayHerName: 
Resisting Police Brutality Against Black Women, AFRICAN AM. POLICY FORUM (July 16, 
2015), http://www.aapf.org/sayhernamereport (report documenting the killing of African 
American women by police officers, as well as providing “some analytical frames for 
understanding their experiences and broaden[ing] dominant conceptions of who experiences 
state violence and what it looks like”).   
 62  See Alice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. Rev. 1182, 1202 
(2017) (“I have presented the doctrinal framework [of police seizures] with barely a word 
about race. That is the way the Supreme Court usually discusses suspicion and its ability to 
legitimate seizures.”).   
 63  This Article does not suggest that advocates should abandon efforts to alter the current 
legal standards like those described above.  Rather, it seeks to support efforts to create more 
racially-conscious seizure analysis under the Fourth Amendment by suggesting a pathway 
works within the analysis as it currently stands, while remaining conscious of the substantial 
limitations of the current analytical approach.   
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A. The Legal Fiction of Legal Knowledge 
The presumption that members of the community are cognizant of the 
law can be found, explicitly and implicitly, throughout our legal system.64  
Notably, the standard of legal knowledge to which civilians are held is much 
higher than that expected of government agents, who, as discussed 
elsewhere, are provided amnesty for reasonable mistakes of law in a variety 
of contexts.65  Civilians are granted no such leniency.66  For example, in the 
criminal system, in a presumption designed in part to promote efficiency,67 
individuals cannot defend themselves against a criminal accusation by 
arguing that they didn’t know the act was illegal.68  Except in certain 
circumstances, such as when the language of the law is unconstitutionally 
vague69 or the knowledge of the law is required by statute,70 people are 
 
 64  See Hamburg-American Steam Packet Co. v. United States, 250 F. 747, 758 (2d Cir. 
1918) (“The principle is elementary that every one is presumed to know the law of the land, 
both common law and statutory law, and that one’s ignorance of it furnishes no exemption 
from criminal responsibility for his acts. ‘Ignorantia juris neminem excusat’ is a maxim in 
both civil and criminal jurisprudence which centuries of experience have approved.”).   
 65  See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Taking Mistakes Seriously, 28 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 71, 81–82 
(2013) (describing doctrines of law, such as qualified immunity, in which reasonable mistakes 
of law by government actors are forgiven; these doctrines “rest on the proposition that not 
every mistake demands a remedy,” as the “criminal justice system is better served through 
forgiveness than punishment when an actor in the criminal process stumbles”).   
 66  Id. at 100 (“Consider the contrast in the type of treatment that the law affords 
government officials and private parties. If a police officer makes a reasonable mistake, he 
does not lose his case or his home; the evidence he acquired can be used at a trial of a suspect 
to establish his guilt . . . . Additionally, a suspect or defendant cannot successfully sue the 
officer, the prosecutor, or the judge for damages even if one of them makes a mistake. By 
contrast, if that same suspect made a reasonable mistake in believing that his actions were 
lawful—a mistake that any reasonable person would have made—he still can be sent to 
prison.”).   
 67  Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 749 (2012) (explaining that among the justifications for the 
principle that members of the community have knowledge of the criminal law is the 
“expediency,” as the burden that proof of such knowledge might place on prosecutors would 
be such that the law would be extremely difficult to uphold).   
 68  Id. at 725–27 (explaining that the maxim “ignorance of the law is no excuse,” is often 
phrased as “[e]very man is presumed to know the law,” and that this principle dates back, at 
least in some form, to Roman law, was then incorporated into English law, and now exists in 
the law of every level of court in the United States).   
 69  See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (“Vagueness may 
invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons. First, it may fail to provide 
the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits; 
second, it may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”).   
 70  Michael Anthony Cottone, Rethinking Presumed Knowledge of the Law in the 
Regulatory Age, 82 TENN. L. REV. 137, 144–45 (2014) (describing the exceptions to the 
“ignorantia legis neminem excusat” principle, such as when the statute includes legal 
knowledge as an element and in certain crimes of omission, and critiquing the ancient 
principle as unworkable in light of the enormous number of complex and obscure laws in the 
modern United States).   
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expected to be aware of the criminal law.  Members of society are further 
assumed to understand the legal consequences of their criminal acts; the 
purported efficacy of lengthy sentences and capital punishment hinge, at 
least in part, on the deterrent effect that public knowledge of these 
consequences should carry.71 
Courts also expect citizens to be cognizant of their constitutional rights.  
To be sure, in some contexts, such as pleading guilty in a criminal case and 
foregoing trial or consenting to speak to police while in custody, the 
voluntariness of an individual’s waiver of constitutional rights depends in 
part on whether that waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.72  In 
such contexts, police officers and judges are charged with providing the 
individual with a written or oral recitation of his or her rights.73  In many 
circumstances in which constitutional rights are implicated, however, 
government actors are not required to inform the community member of the 
applicable constitutional law,74 and, in some situations, a person must clearly 
and on her own volition invoke a constitutional right in order to be shielded 
by it.75  In reaching these conclusions, perhaps courts believe that community 
members knew or should know the law, or perhaps courts are entirely 
unconcerned about whether the community member at issue possessed such 
 
 71  See William T. Pizzi, Understanding the United States’ Incarceration Rate: What Has 
Caused Prison Sentences to Climb So Sharply and Consistently in the Last Four Decades?, 
95 JUDICATURE 207, 207–08 (2012) (discussing the history of the deterrence theory of 
punishment in the United States).   
 72  See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28–
29 (1992) (“It is beyond dispute that a guilty plea must be both knowing and voluntary.. . . 
That is so because a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of three constitutional rights: the right to 
a jury trial, the right to confront one’s accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination.”).   
 73  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237–38, 242 (1973) (explaining that 
Supreme Court precedent requiring a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of constitutional 
rights, “has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal 
defendant in order to preserve a fair trial,” such as “the right to confrontation, to a jury trial, 
and to a speedy trial, and the right to be free from twice being placed in jeopardy,” as well as 
“trial-type situations, such as . . . the waiver of counsel in a juvenile proceeding.”  The 
“knowing and voluntary” waiver standard does not apply in the Fourth Amendment context, 
however, as “[t]he protections of the Fourth Amendment are of a wholly different order, and 
have nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal 
trial”).   
 74  See, e.g., id. at 227 (holding that a person’s knowledge of his or constitutional right to 
refuse a police request to conduct a warrantless search is a factor in determining whether the 
consent was voluntary or the result of duress or coercion, but “the government need not 
establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent”).   
 75  See, e.g., Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (holding that a man who was 
voluntarily speaking with police without having been Mirandized, but who fell silent after 
being specifically questioned about a murder weapon, could have his silence used against him 
at trial; the Fifth Amendment did not apply because he simply “stood mute” and did not 
“expressly invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in response to the officer’s 
question”).   
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legal knowledge.76  In either case, in the words of the Supreme Court, “a 
citizen who lacks knowledge of his basic constitutional rights has only 
himself to blame.”77 
In the Fourth Amendment seizure context, as with other areas of the 
law, courts do not require police officers to notify civilians that they have the 
right to terminate the encounter, and the lack of such notice is not dispositive 
in determining whether a reasonable person would feel free to ignore the 
officer’s requests or otherwise end the interaction.78  At least implicitly, 
therefore, a reasonable person is one who knows that under the Constitution, 
some interactions with the police are merely consensual encounters that 
civilians may end at any time,79 and one who is also able to accurately 








 76  Young & Munsch, supra note 53, at 448 (noting in relation to the holding in Salinas 
that “[t]wo conclusions are possible: either the Court believed it was realistic for someone in 
Salinas’s position to have this level of rights knowledge, or the Court knew that this level of 
rights knowledge might be unrealistic, but found this unproblematic (or simply did not know 
and did not care)”).   
 77  See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 470 (2011) (stating that the people within a 
dwelling who, rather than refusing entry to police who knocked on their door without a 
warrant, “choose not to stand on their constitutional rights but instead elect to attempt to 
destroy evidence have only themselves to blame for the warrantless exigent-circumstances 
search that may ensue”); see also Young & Munsch, supra note 53, at 447 (arguing that 
“absent unconstitutional coercion, [a person’s] decision about whether to assert a right he 
knows he possesses is a product of his own ratiocination”).   
 78  United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (“Our conclusion that no 
seizure occurred is not affected by the fact that the respondent was not expressly told by the 
agents that she was free to decline to cooperate with their inquiry, for the voluntariness of her 
responses does not depend upon her having been so informed.”).   
 79  See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983) (citations omitted) (“The person 
approached, however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to 
listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily 
without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does 
not, without more, furnish those grounds.”).   
 80  Civilians are held accountable for misidentifying when an encounter has become a 
seizure, and attempts to refuse requests or to otherwise terminate the encounter after a seizure 
has occurred can lead to charges such as resisting arrest or preventing officers from 
discharging their duty, among others.  See Monu Bedi, The Asymmetry of Crimes by and 
Against Police Officers, 66 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 79 (2017) (discussing enhanced penalties for 
crimes against police officers).  This is the case despite the Supreme Court’s 
acknowledgement that “it is not always clear just when minimal police interference becomes 
a seizure.”  Tennessee v. Gardner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).   
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Further, courts do not treat the fact that the person did not terminate the 
encounter—as most people do not81— as evidence that the person did not 
feel reasonably free to do so.  Rather, judges tacitly, if not overtly, assume 
that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would know her right to 
refuse the officer’s requests and any continued interaction with law 
enforcement was consequently voluntary.82  Courts further assume that the 
police officers involved in the seizure have an understanding of criminal law 
as well as knowledge of the constitutional and statutory parameters 
surrounding their interactions with the public, although, as noted previously, 
officers are also permitted to be reasonably mistaken about some aspects of 
the law.83 
The presumption that members of society have both knowledge of the 
substantive law and an understanding of how it is applied, while ubiquitous 
in our legal system, is not an evidence-based conclusion.84  According to a 
recent study addressing the level of legal knowledge possessed by members 
of the public, most people in the United States have a limited understanding 
of the law and the legal system.85  Further, even people who have a grasp of 
 
 81  Because the majority of people comply with police requests and demands, most 
seizure analyses involve circumstances in which the person contacted by the police did not 
end the interaction.  See Alisa M. Smith et al., Testing Judicial Assumptions of the 
“Consensual” Encounter: An Experimental Study, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 285, 291 (2013) 
(relating the results of a study that demonstrated that “upon an encounter with security, not 
one of the eighty-three people during the four stages of the encounter terminated the encounter 
with, walked away from, or ignored the officers. One hundred percent of those encountered 
complied through every stage of the interaction. Not a single individual even questioned the 
officer’s authority or asked whether he had to comply. Gender, race, or situational factors 
(including the number of officers, location of the encounter, or time of day) did not matter.”).   
 82  See Eric J. Miller, Encountering Resistance: Contesting Policing and Procedural 
Justice, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 296 (2016) (explaining that the “United States 
Constitution not only entrenches rights to resist the police, but also requires civilians to resist 
policing precisely as the means of asserting those rights. The right to decline a police 
encounter, or police officer’s request to search, or police officer’s demand to answer questions 
on the street or at the front door, or during an interrogation requires the public to refuse to 
comply by walking away, or remaining silent, or calling for a lawyer. To fail to take these 
non-compliant measures negates those rights.”).   
 83  Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).  Police officers can rely on reasonable 
mistakes of the law when forming reasonable suspicion, such as in Heien, when an officer 
stopped a vehicle for a brake light violation based on a misunderstanding of a statute at issue 
that was confusingly worded. See Larkin, Jr., supra note 65, at 72 (discussing areas of the 
law, such as in the reasonable-mistake exception to the exclusionary rule, in which the law 
provides leeway for “reasonable, honest” mistakes by government officials); Wayne A. 
Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 70 (2011) (describing judicial “willingness 
to excuse police mistakes of law”).   
 84  Young & Munsch, supra note 53, at 449 (discussing the historic lack of significant 
quantitative and qualitative data regarding citizen rights knowledge and rights assertion, and 
reviewing the results of the studies that do exist).   
 85  Id. at 462-66 (reporting the findings of their own study regarding rights knowledge 
and rights assertion, specifically that people are largely unaware of their rights, and “when 
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a constitutional right or of a particular area of the law—such as the “right to 
remain silent” when questioned by the police or the definition of a “criminal 
act”—commonly misunderstand its scope or application.86  In the seizure 
context, for example, people are often unaware that they are permitted to 
terminate any encounter with the police or that they may refuse some police 
requests.87  Studies also show that even if people are aware that they are 
permitted to terminate encounters with the police, many are afraid to do so.88  
Indeed, common sense tells us that assuming a person without legal training 
has a meaningful comprehension of our complex laws and legal institutions 
is, at best, a legal illusion.  Nevertheless, courts, scholars, and others assert 
the necessity and value of citizens’ understanding of the law, both for the 
efficacy of the legal system and because such knowledge is essential to an 
involved and functioning citizenry.89 
In the Fourth Amendment seizure analysis, as in other areas of the law, 
courts have assumed that both a reasonable police officer and a reasonable 
civilian would be aware of the relevant law implicating the interaction.  
Despite this fundamental assumption, courts have not recognized or explored 
the implications of citizen knowledge of the law governing police 
misconduct in assessing whether a reasonable person would feel free to 
terminate the encounter.  This Part now turns to the question of why courts 
 
they try to figure out which rights they possess, the current procedural regime leads them to 
perform even worse than chance.” Interestingly, rights knowledge is “not correlated with 
demographic factors such as race, social class, or even prior experience as a subject of 
criminal investigation,” although the “willingness to assert rights is positively correlated with 
social position”).   
 86  Id. at 473–74 (providing an overview of studies demonstrating that “not only do people 
not know their rights, but they also hold misconceptions that lead them to incorrect 
conclusions . . . . the knowledge people do have appears to lead them astray”).   
 87  Kessler, supra note 48, n.142 (reporting that 60% of people studied were not aware of 
their rights in the seizure context).   
 88  Nadler, supra note 47, at 155 (stating that “empirical studies over the last several 
decades on the social psychology of compliance, conformity, social influence, and politeness 
have all converged on a single conclusion: the extent to which people feel free to refuse to 
comply is extremely limited under situationally induced pressures”).   
 89  See Ahson T. Azmat, What Mistake of Law Just Might Be: Legal Moralism, Liberal 
Positivism, and the Mistake of Law Doctrine, 18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 369, 370–71 (2015) 
(describing the Positivism justification for the Mistake of Law doctrine, originating with 
Justice Holmes, as “arguing that it is designed to encourage individuals to acquire legal 
knowledge—that is, to undertake research in order to learn what the law is.  On this account, 
by warning individuals that ignorance shall not excuse, the doctrine strips them of an incentive 
to engage in ‘strategic heedlessness’ or ‘willful ignorance.’”); Meese & Larkin, Jr., supra note 
67, at 726-27 (“[A]n old criminal law proverb is the proposition that ‘Ignorance of the law is 
no excuse,’ which sometimes is phrased as a rule of evidence that ‘Every man is presumed to 
know the law.’ The ignorance-of-the-law rule traces its lineage back to Roman law. The 
English common law courts adopted the rule, from whence it came to America. In this country, 
state and federal courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as criminal 
law treatise writers, have long endorsed that rule.”).   
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have failed to address this type of legal knowledge in the seizure context, 
and outlines the law governing police wrongdoing that a reasonable person 
might be presumed to understand. 
B. Knowledge of the Law Governing Police Misconduct 
In the application of the seizure analysis, courts, at least implicitly, 
characterize a reasonable person as one who views the objective 
circumstances of that encounter within the framework of the applicable 
law.90  The question of whether a reasonable person would understand those 
circumstances—flashing lights, demanding tones, and so forth—as denoting 
a limitation on her freedom to terminate the encounter necessarily depends 
on knowledge that such freedom exists in the first place.  Further, courts 
assume that a reasonable person is one who understands that, once an 
encounter has escalated to a seizure, there are legal consequences when an 
individual fails to comply with police demands.  That is to say, if a person 
who had been legally seized attempted to elude police, she could not take 
refuge in legal ignorance as a defense to criminal charges that might ensue, 
such as eluding police or resisting arrest.91 
The judicial assumption of relevant legal knowledge in the seizure 
analysis does seem to have its limits.  In conducting this inquiry, courts 
generally presume, implicitly if not explicitly, that a reasonable person is one 
who believes that the police themselves will comply with the law.  Courts 
undertaking a seizure inquiry thus do not consider whether a reasonable 
person would contemplate the possibility that assertion of her constitutional 
rights could be met with unjustified police violence or with groundless stops 
or arrests, and whether the police would face legal consequences for such 
acts.  The ‘race-neutral’ reasonable person appears instead to be one who 
believes that if she complies with the law and asserts the appropriate 
constitutional rights at the appropriate time and in the appropriate way, the 
police will, in turn, respect that assertion and take no further action.92  This 
 
 90  Evan M. McGuire, Consensual Police-Citizen Encounters: Human Factors of a 
Reasonable Person and Individual Bias, 16 SCHOLAR ST. MARY’S L. REV. & SOC. JUST. 693, 
707–08 (2014) (In undertaking the objective reasonable person analysis in the seizure context, 
“courts assume a reasonable person . . . is aware of the Fourth Amendment’s nuances and 
attendant abilities granted to government officers under each level of scrutiny . . . .  
Furthermore, in the Supreme Court’s estimation, a reasonable person will consistently resist 
the advances of an aggressive officer seeking consent, cognizant that refusing to consent 
cannot create its own reasonable suspicion.”).   
 91  See Margaret Raymond, The Right to Refuse and the Obligation to Comply: 
Challenging the Gamesmanship Model of Criminal Procedure, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1483, 1504 
(2007) (outlining possible consequences to civilians for failure to obey a police officer).   
 92  Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that the police may not use the fact that a 
person asserts his rights to refuse to cooperate with the police as grounds for detention if other 
grounds do not exist.  See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 556 (1980).   
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largely unspoken assumption is presumably based on the court’s belief that 
a reasonable person would have faith in the officer’s inherent integrity and 
confidence that the officer is legally prevented from acting improperly.93 
Indeed, rather than asking whether objective legal knowledge might 
affect a reasonable person’s assessment of her freedom to terminate a police 
encounter, courts seem to have treated concerns regarding police 
misbehavior as a subjective viewpoint—one based on the individual’s 
personal experiences or beliefs, and thus beyond the scope of the objective 
reasonable person analysis.94  This perspective reflects the race-adverse 
nature of the seizure analysis; under this approach, an objective, ‘race-
neutral’ reasonable person would not fear police misconduct nor ask whether 
the law prevents it, as such considerations are the subjective, individualized 
concerns of people of color. 
This Article suggests that the combination of the objective reasonable 
person standard, the legal fiction that members of society are cognizant of 
the applicable law, and the judicial commitment to the value of ‘race-
neutrality’ in the seizure analysis might provide an unexpected opportunity 
for a more racially realistic Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  If the seizure 
analysis is one that does not consider race, then a reasonable person within 
that analysis should be one who looks objectively at the law as it applies to 
police transgressions and assumes it is applied ‘race-neutrally.’  A 
reasonable person assessing her freedom to terminate an encounter with the 
police might thus ask: (a) if I assert my right to terminate this encounter, 
what law should deter the officer from seizing me without cause? and (b) if 
I assert my right to terminate this encounter, what law should deter the officer 
from using unjustified force against me? 
Police officers are expected, of course, to abide by the law.  If they fail 
to do so, the law provides for a variety of consequences, including the 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence at the arrested person’s criminal 
trial; criminal charges; civil penalties; and internal police sanctions.95  Yet, a 
 
 93  See Ross, supra note 50, at 339 (noting that the reasonable person test in the seizure 
analysis “assumes a certain level of trust. Not only does the Court assume that the police will 
not punish those who try to leave in determining whether there has been a consensual 
encounter, but the Court also assumes that individuals trust the police will not punish them 
for asserting this right. The data proves the assumption of trust is unfounded.”).   
 94  Maclin, supra note 53, at 248 (“[I]nstead of acknowledging the reality that exists on 
the street, the Court hides behind a legal fiction. The Court constructs Fourth Amendment 
principles assuming that there is an average, hypothetical person who interacts with the police 
officers. This notion is naive, it produces distorted Fourth Amendment rules and ignores the 
real world that police officers and black men live in.”).   
 95  See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, The Real-World Fourth Amendment, 43 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 759, 802–03 (2016) (“Traditionally, with respect to Fourth Amendment violations, there 
are two main types of remedies: ‘suppression’ of the ‘tainted’ evidence in a criminal 
prosecution (‘the exclusionary rule’) and/or a civil remedy such as money damages or an 
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close look at the ways in which these areas of the law have evolved 
demonstrates that officers face little risk of suffering any serious penalty for 
misconduct in the Fourth Amendment—or any other—context.96  This is so 
both because the risk of detection of Fourth Amendment violations is low,97 
and because the legal standards applied to police misconduct provide a great 
deal of protection for police officers suspected of violating the law.  A 
reasonable person with knowledge of the law would thus  be  aware that the 
applicable law does not serve to reliably deter or punish police wrongdoing.98 
This Part will turn to an overview of the law that addresses police 
misconduct, and, in so doing, identify what a reasonable person might be 
presumed to understand about the available legal remedies and deterrents to 
police wrongdoing. 
1.  Evidence Exclusion 
Since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Weeks v. United States over one 
hundred years ago, evidence either obtained as a direct result of, or derived 
from, searches or seizures conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
cannot be admitted against the defendant at a criminal trial.99  The Supreme 
Court and lower courts viewed the rule as arising from the Fourth 
 
injunction in a civil rights case. According to the Supreme Court, however, violations of the 
Fourth Amendment do not automatically mean that either of these remedies will be available.  
As discussed below, the Court has placed numerous limits on the remedies available for a 
Fourth Amendment violation.”); Corinthia A. Carter, Police Brutality, The Law & Today’s 
Social Justice Movement: How the Lack of Police Accountability Has Fueled #Hashtag 
Activism, 20 CUNY L. REV. 521 (2017) (describing federal, state, local, and administrative 
remedies for police misconduct, and their failure to prevent police brutality).   
 96  Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV. 687, 
755 (2011) (“Professor Anthony Amsterdam has observed that when a constitutional remedy 
is too severe, many judges will ‘prefer the disease.’ At this point in the history of the Fourth 
Amendment, we are in danger of experiencing an inversion of this problem. A remedy is so 
rarely available—either in habeas, civil actions, or criminal litigation—that courts may soon 
regard diagnosing the precise disease, if any, as a strenuous and avoidable chore.”).   
 97  See Miriam H. Baer, Pricing the Fourth Amendment, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1103, 
1115–20 (2017) (discussing the difficulty of detecting when law enforcement officers violate 
the Fourth Amendment).   
 98  See Michael D. Cicchini, An Economics Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule and 
Deterrence, 75 MO. L. REV. 459, 470, 477–78 (2010) (applying economic theory to the laws 
intended to deter police misconduct, and concluding that if the expected benefits of such 
misconduct outweigh the expected costs, “the rational police officer will engage in the 
misconduct.”  Because the expected costs related to police wrongdoing is low in all areas of 
potential risk—evidence exclusion, civil suits, internal sanctions, and so forth—”none of 
these potential sanctions acts as a deterrent.  Further, and perhaps counterintuitively, some 
even encourage police violations of suspects’ constitutional rights.”).   
 99  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S 383, 398 (1914) (applying the exclusionary rule to 
federal law enforcement); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963) 
(establishing the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 
(1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to states).   
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Amendment, and it was understood to both protect individual rights and to 
ensure that the justice system did not rely on evidence tainted by illegal 
activity.100 
The application of this principle was once fairly automatic: if the court 
identified a seizure or search as occurring in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, the evidence “secured incident to that violation” could not be 
used by the government to prove the charge against the defendant at trial.101  
Over time, however, the Supreme Court redefined the rule as a remedy 
created by the Court rather than one arising from the Constitution, and re-
characterized the rule’s primary value as deterring police misconduct.102  The 
deterrence-based focus has accompanied, or perhaps instigated, a 
substantially more convoluted application of the exclusionary rule.  The 
correlation between illegal police conduct and evidence suppression has 
grown more and more attenuated, as courts seek to balance what they view 
as the appropriate level of police deterrence (not too much, so police are 
overly afraid to act, and not too little, so police have no limitations) against 
the judicially-identified social costs of evidence exclusion.103  In the words 
of one commentator on contemporary Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
analysis, “[n]othing else matters except deterring police misconduct and the 
countervailing social cost of excluding probative evidence.”104 
This cost-benefit analysis has yielded a Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary jurisprudence that commentators have referred to as “a 
mess.”105  Exceptions to the cut-and-dried approach to exclusion of evidence 
derived from unconstitutional searches and seizures have proliferated.  
Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, for example, evidence obtained as 
the result of illegal police conduct will be admitted at trial if it would have 
“ultimately or inevitably” lawfully been discovered anyway.106  In such 
 
 100  Eugene Milhizer, The Exclusionary Rule Lottery, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 755, 756–57 
(2008).   
 101  Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 13 (1995); Kyle Robbins, Davis, Jones, and the Good-
Faith Exception: Why Reasonable Police Reliance on Persuasive Appellant Precedent 
Precludes Application of the Exclusionary Rule, 82 MISS. L.J. 1175, 1179 (2013) (discussing 
the history of the exclusionary rule).   
 102  Milhizer, supra note 100, at 757.   
 103  For this reason, the exclusionary rule does not apply to hearings other than trials, as 
courts have assumed that the deterrent value of excluding evidence in, for example, grand 
jury proceedings, deportation hearings, and federal civil tax proceedings would be outweighed 
by the loss of the use of the probative evidence.  See WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: 
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1(f) (5th ed. 2016).   
 104  Milhizer, supra note 100, at 759.   
 105  Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 821, 821–22 (2013).   
 106  Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447 (1984); Marceau, supra note 96, at 734.  To benefit 
from the inevitable discovery doctrine, the government must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that, despite the illegality of the search, the evidence should be admitted into trial 
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circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence should be 
admitted, as the disadvantage of excluding evidence that officers could have 
obtained legally outweighs whatever deterrent benefit exclusion might have 
carried.107  In addition, under the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule, officers may reasonably rely on information that later turned out to be 
incorrect, such as a court-issued warrant that was found to be constitutionally 
inadequate,108 an inactive warrant mistakenly recorded as active by a clerk 
in a court database,109 and binding case law that was later overturned.110  The 
good faith exception rests on the reasoning that officers will not be deterred 
from future misconduct by exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of 
reasonable reliance on wrong information, and thus the cost of the exclusion 
outweighed the benefit.111 
Far from the straightforward application of the exclusionary rule in its 
earlier years, under its current application the Supreme Court has made clear 
that exclusion of evidence is considered a “last resort.”112  In Herring v. 
United States, the Court explained that, “[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, 
police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can 
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth 
the price paid by the justice system”113—a price that includes allowing the 
guilty and dangerous to escape justice.114  The deterrent benefit must be 
 
because the police could have found it through legal means, although they did not actually do 
so.  See 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Searches and Seizures § 174, Inevitable Discovery Exception.  
Perhaps, for example, the evidence would eventually have been seen in plain view, or perhaps 
the police would ultimately have been legally entitled to conduct an inventory of the car in 
which the evidence was improperly found.   
 107   Nix, supra note 106, at 443-44.   
 108  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).   
 109  Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).   
 110  Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011).   
 111  Kinports, supra note 105, at 825–28 (providing an overview of good faith exception 
caselaw, and noting the Court’s reasoning in Davis that “exclusion in those circumstances 
‘deters no police misconduct’ and therefore ‘suppression would do nothing to deter’ the 
police”).   
 112  In Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court did not exclude evidence obtained by 
police officers who violated the procedure for a ‘knock-and-announce’ execution of a search 
warrant.  547 U.S. at 591.  The Court, stating that the suppression of evidence “has always 
been our last resort, not our first impulse,” reasoned that the deterrent value of excluding 
evidence for such a violation was low, because police officers did not have much to gain from 
failing to abide by knock-and-announce procedures and therefore would be likely to comply 
with them even absent the risk of evidence exclusion.  Id. at 591.   
 113  555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).  In Herring v. New York, a police officer arrested a person 
based on an inactive warrant that was mistakenly recorded as active in a police computer 
system. Id.   
 114  Id. at 141.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 81–83 (explaining that the exclusionary 
rule is affected by the fact that judges in criminal cases see a “biased sample”—only those 
searches in which evidence was discovered, not the many in which nothing was found—and 
“because judges don’t want to let a bad guy go, they bless what the police did in that case, no 
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extraordinarily high, therefore, to outweigh the magnitude of that cost.  The 
Herring Court then introduced a mens rea element to the exclusionary rule 
analysis, holding that police errors that constituted “isolated negligence”—
rather than the more serious “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent 
conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence”—
would not be meaningfully deterred by evidence exclusion.115  These and 
other exceptions to the exclusionary rule have triggered an avalanche of 
scholarship and commentary, and the proliferation of such exceptions has 
caused courts and others to question what, if any, power the exclusionary 
rule holds today.116 
A reasonable person with an understanding of the exclusionary rule 
would, at minimum, know the following things: that the exceptions to the 
rule are myriad, and it is difficult to predict when such an exception will 
apply; that courts have determined that the rule does not act as a sufficient 
deterrent to justify evidence exclusion in a wide variety of situations, 
including those in which officers have acted negligently or failed to know or 
follow the law; and that exclusion of evidence will occur only as a last resort.  
A reasonable person with this legal knowledge might rationally conclude 
that police officers would not be meaningfully deterred from conducting an 
illegal seizure by fear of the risk of evidentiary exclusion.117 
2. Civil Consequences 
As the exclusionary rule has waned in power, courts have pointed to 
the existence of civil remedies such as injunctive relief and money damages 
as providing a more powerful deterrent to police misconduct than 
exclusionary principles.118  There are, however, serious questions as to 
whether civil remedies serve to limit police wrongdoing, starting with the 
lack of clear legal standards regarding police behavior. 
 
 
matter how out of line it was.” Once that blessing has occurred, it provides precedent that 
condones the same behavior in future cases.).   
 115  Herring, 555 U.S. at 137, 144.   
 116  FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 83 (“Not only does judicial distaste for the effect of the 
exclusionary rule lead to bad decisions, it also is leading the Supreme Court to systemically 
dismantle the exclusionary rule itself.”); See also Kinports, supra note 105, at 832 
(“[C]ommentators across the political spectrum representing a variety of jurisprudential 
disciplines have acknowledged that deterrence is not susceptible to empirical proof and thus 
at some level is largely a matter of conjecture.”).   
 117  This conclusion would be bolstered if the person was further aware that the vast 
majority of criminal cases are resolved by plea bargain, thus rendering the exclusionary rule, 
which attaches at trial, moot.  See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (“Ninety-
seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result 
of guilty pleas.”).   
 118  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596–99 (2006).   
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As Professor Barry Friedman has argued, courts are comfortable 
providing guidance as to what police are allowed to do, but tend to avoid 
bright-line rules when it comes to imposing limitations on police power.119  
In evaluating whether the police violated the law, therefore, courts often 
consider all the circumstances at issue rather than setting definitive 
parameters limiting police conduct.120  Here, as with the exclusionary rule, 
judicial decision-making is influenced by the desire to deter police 
misconduct while not going so far that police become afraid to act at all.121 
For example, in Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court noted that 
police officers are allowed to use “some degree of physical coercion or threat 
thereof” when effecting a seizure.  The Court held that, when considering 
excessive force claims against officers, courts should evaluate the use of that 
force under the objective Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard, 
which involves a balancing of the intrusion on the civilian’s Fourth 
Amendment rights against the “countervailing governmental interests at 
stake.”122  Reasonableness is judged from the perspective of a police officer 
on the scene who is making “split-second judgments—in circumstances that 
are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is 
necessary in a particular situation.”123  Even cases which appear to establish 
a bright-line rule, such as Tennessee v. Garner’s prohibition against officers 
using deadly force to apprehend unarmed, non-dangerous fleeing suspects, 
involve balancing tests and circumstance-focused analyses that give the 
benefit of the doubt to police officers.124  The lack of clear guidelines 
 
 119  FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 86–87 (emphasis in original) (arguing that “the Supreme 
Court is happy to fashion clear rules telling the police what they can do, but terrified of telling 
them what they cannot,” and describing the abundance of bright line rules regarding 
permissible police actions—such as the power to arrest for any legal violation, including those 
that carry no incarceration penalties, as established by Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 
(2001), and the dearth of such clear rules proscribing police actions).   
 120  Id. at 87 (emphasis in original) (“But when asked to formulate a rule for what police 
may not do, the justices invariably choke. All of a sudden, clear rules are a problem . . . . [I]t 
is sheer delusion to believe the courts are regulating the police when no one else does. The 
courts aren’t either.”).   
 121  Id. at 84 (“Like Goldilocks’s porridge, when it comes to deterring police misconduct, 
one wants to get it exactly right.”).   
 122  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).   
 123  Id. at 396–97.  See Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 
103 VA. L. REV. 211, 223–24 (2017) (contending that the use-of force balancing test requires 
courts to look at the “facts known to the officer at the moment that force is employed.”).  The 
test does not take into account what the officer may have done to escalate the situation, nor 
does it consider what steps the officer could have taken to avoid the use of force, and thus is 
neither truly a totality of the circumstances test nor a reasonableness test.   
 124  Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (holding that “[a] police officer may not 
seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead,” but “where the officer has 
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the 
officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly 
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regarding police misconduct thus makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to 
establish that the police violated a person’s Fourth Amendment rights.125  
Complicating the situation still further is the fact that legal routes to remedies 
for such misconduct are convoluted and often blocked entirely. 
A basic outline of the state of the law of civil remedies for police 
wrongdoing reveals its complexities and limitations.126  A person who has 
been harmed by police officers and seeks money damages, for example, must 
navigate a byzantine set of legal standards.  Except in narrow circumstances, 
that person cannot sue the federal or state government in federal court 
because those entities are protected by sovereign immunity.127  She can sue 
federal,128 state,129 and local officials in their individual capacities, although 
local officials can only be sued for damages if the agent at issue was acting 
pursuant to an official “policy or custom”130—a standard that is extremely 
difficult to meet.131  Further, in suits seeking retrospective damages for 
individuals in their individual capacities, the plaintiff faces the additional 
hurdle of overcoming qualified immunity, a doctrine which protects 
government officials from liability if “their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
 
force.”).  See ZIMRING, supra note 3, 122–23 (discussing the fact that although Garner 
established decades ago that police may not use lethal force to seize a person in the absence 
of serious risk of harm to the officers or community, the Supplemental Homicide Reporting 
system within the FBI’s Uniform Criminal Reporting Section lists all killing of felons by 
police as “justifiable homicides”).   
 125  See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007) (In evaluating whether a police officer 
violated the Fourth Amendment though his use of force, courts do not have recourse to an 
“easy to apply legal test,” but must instead “slosh . . . through the factbound morass of 
‘reasonableness.’”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (“The test of reasonableness 
under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.”).   
 126  For a helpful and thorough summary of the law governing civil litigation related to 
allegations of Fourth Amendment violations by the police, see Marceau, supra note 96, at 
717–30.   
 127  See Hans v. State of Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (holding that a person cannot 
sue a state in federal court without the state’s consent); U.S. CONST. amend XI (“The Judicial 
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).   
 128  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971).   
 129  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).   
 130  Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (“We conclude, 
therefore, that a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely 
by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, 
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent 
official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 
1983.”).   
 131  Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68 FLA. L. REV. 
1773, 1776–77 (2016) (describing the policy and custom requirement as a “near-impossible” 
standard).   
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would have known.”132 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Pearson v. Callahan, courts 
determining whether a government official is protected by qualified 
immunity may first decide if a right was “clearly established” before 
determining whether it was a right anchored in the Constitution;133 indeed, if 
a court determines that the right was not clearly established, it often does not 
address the question of constitutionality at all.134  As critics have observed, 
however, courts generally find that a rule or law was clearly established at 
the time of the officer’s conduct only when a previous case or cases in the 
same jurisdiction found fault with almost identical police behavior.135  This 
cramped approach to the ‘clearly established’ analysis has expanded 
qualified immunity protections to such a degree that the Supreme Court has 
declared that qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law.”136  As a practical matter, furthermore, 
the vast majority of officers are indemnified by the jurisdictions in which 
they work, and thus even if damages are imposed against them they are borne 
by the municipality and not the individual.137 
 
 132  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Some jurisdictions also ask whether 
the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of the established law, which “makes 
it even harder for plaintiffs to succeed against defendant officers.” Cover, supra note 131, at 
1810. In addition to qualified immunity, some government officials are granted absolute 
immunity from suit. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (granting 
legislators absolute immunity under § 43 (now § 1983)); see also Alan Chen, The Facts About 
Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 234–35 (2006) (describing the absolute immunity 
doctrine).   
 133  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).  The Court in Pearson overruled 
Saucier v. Katz, in which the Court mandated that lower courts determine whether a 
constitutional violation occurred before determining whether the right involved was clearly 
established.  533 U.S. 194, 201 (1994).  For a review of the history of the qualified immunity 
doctrine, and an empirical analysis of the impact of the order of analysis on acknowledgement 
of constitutional rights, see Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An 
Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667 (2009).   
 134  Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Strategic Immunity, 66 EMORY L.J. 55, 71 
(2016) (“Since Pearson, the Court has repeatedly exercised this discretion, sometimes opting 
to decide the constitutional question and sometimes not.”); Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, 
Note, An Empirical Analysis of Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of 
Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523 (2010) (reviewing cases in which courts addressed 
the constitutional violation question and considering the impact of such consideration on the 
grant of qualified immunity).   
 135  Cover, supra note 131, at 1792–93 (explaining that the Supreme Court “has defined 
‘clearly established’ so as to require that case law involve an almost exact same set of facts 
and that the case come from the Supreme Court or a circuit court of the same jurisdiction. The 
clearly established law test’s rigid specificity requirement has proven difficult for plaintiffs 
to surmount. The Court has admonished courts not to look to generalities of law but only to 
precedents mirroring the complaint’s set of facts.”).   
 136  Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).   
 137  See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 912–13 
(2014) (reporting study results which indicated that, in forty-four jurisdictions covered by the 
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Plaintiffs in police brutality cases thus face significant barriers to 
success.138  This is not to say that police departments never pay damages or 
undertake institutional changes as a result of lawsuits; these consequences 
certainly occur, and in some cases cost jurisdictions millions of dollars.139  
There is no evidence, however, that even these large damage amounts deter 
police wrongdoing.  Further, because officer misconduct, including the 
commission of acts of violence against community members, is rarely met 
with legal consequences, in the words of Professor Franklin Zimring, “police 
killings . . . are usually dirt cheap.”140 
The applicable law regarding injunctive or declaratory relief is 
similarly difficult to navigate.  A person may bring a lawsuit for declaratory 
or injunctive relief against a federal,141 state,142 or local143 official in his 
official capacity—although again, only if the local government employee 
was acting pursuit to agency custom, policy, or practice.144  While the 
qualified immunity doctrine does not apply in suits seeking injunctive or 
declaratory relief from the actions of federal or state agents acting in their 
official capacity, plaintiffs in such cases face a different obstacle to litigation.  
Because they are asking for prospective relief, they must demonstrate that, 
under the standing requirement of Article III of the United States 
Constitution, there is a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ that the court is capable of 
resolving.145  Plaintiffs can only meet this standard if they can demonstrate 
that an injury is imminent, not hypothetical.146 
The Court’s ruling in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons set a high bar for the 
establishment of imminent injury.  In Lyons, the Court held that, despite 
substantial evidence that Los Angeles police officers routinely applied 
 
study, police officers paid only 0.02% of damages recovered by plaintiffs in civil rights suits 
as a result of indemnification).   
 138  Cover, supra note 131, at 1777 (stating that, as a consequence both of the qualified 
immunity doctrine and the Supreme Court’s focus on the police perspective when assessing 
allegations of excessive force, it is “exceedingly difficult for victims of police brutality to 
overcome defendants’ motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment.”).   
 139  See Rachel Moran, Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 850–51 
(2016) (reviewing monetary awards paid in several high-profile police misconduct cases).   
 140  ZIMRING, supra note 3, at 120; id. at 126–28 (describing the lack of data on how many 
lawsuits are filed related to police killings, how many of those lawsuits are successful, the 
range of settlement outcomes, and the extent to which the government pays any damages 
imposed, but noting that most of the “immediate costs are imposed on the victims of violence 
and their families”).   
 141  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).   
 142  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).   
 143  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).   
 144  Los Angeles Cty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 37 (2010) (holding that the policy or 
custom requirement of Monell applies to suits for injunctive relief as well as damages).   
 145  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.   
 146  Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983).   
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chokeholds to members of the community, Mr. Lyons, who himself had been 
choked by an officer, could not establish “a real and immediate threat that he 
would again be stopped for a traffic violation, or for any other offense, by an 
officer or officers who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness 
without any provocation or resistance on his part.”147  Without such a 
demonstration, Mr. Lyons did not establish standing to sue.148  Such a 
challenging standing requirement has served to significantly impede 
litigation seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, as plaintiffs in such suits 
struggle to establish Article III standing. 
A reasonable person with even a basic understanding of the law 
governing civil lawsuits involving police misconduct would know that police 
misconduct is not clearly defined, making it difficult for plaintiffs to 
establish that a legal violation has occurred, and the law either completely 
blocks the filing of suits or establishes extremely high barriers to plaintiff 
success.  A person with this legal knowledge could then rationally conclude 
that police officers would not be meaningfully deterred from conducting an 
illegal seizure by fear of the risk of civil consequences. 
3. Other Potential Penalties 
A police officer who uses unjustified force or violence against a civilian 
could, like all members of society who violate the law, face criminal charges 
as a result of his actions.149  In order for this to occur, a prosecutor must be 
willing to charge the officer and/or bring a case before a grand jury to obtain 
an indictment.  The prosecution must also be willing to seek a conviction, 
which in the case of trial requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
officer is guilty of all elements of the crimes for which he is charged.  These 
procedural hoops and protections apply to police as they do to all members 
of society, but charging and convicting police officers with crimes 
committed on the job has its own unique challenges due to the protections 
that the law and the legal system provide to law enforcement officers 
suspected of wrongdoing. 
 
 147  Id. at 105–06 (“In order to establish an actual controversy in this case, Lyons would 
have had not only to allege that he would have another encounter with the police but also to 
make the incredible assertion either, (1) that all police officers in Los Angeles always choke 
any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest, 
issuing a citation or for questioning or, (2) that the City ordered or authorized police officers 
to act in such manner.”).   
 148  Id.  at 107–12.   
 149  See Bedi, supra note 80, at 82–83, n.20 (noting that the officer may be prosecuted 
under state or federal criminal law statutes, or might perhaps face consequences under 
“official oppression statutes,” which are “broadly worded laws that make it a crime for a 
police officer or other official to knowingly abuse her power,” or the close federal equivalent, 
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 242, which “subjects police officers to liability if they deprive 
a person of a constitutional right, which can include physical harm.”).   
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First, prosecutors work closely with police officers, a connection that 
has caused observers to raise concerns regarding bias and conflicts of interest 
when DA’s offices are called upon to investigate and prosecute law 
enforcement.150  Prosecutors have provided police officers with a heightened 
level of process before making charging decisions or seeking an indictment, 
such as presenting detailed evidence to grand juries that includes the police 
officer’s perspective and testimony that supports that perspective.151  This 
approach is rarely undertaken in cases where the suspect is not on the police 
force.  Further, in many jurisdictions, police are statutorily protected under a 
Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBOR) from particular 
methods of investigation at the hands of other officers, such as certain types 
of interrogation tactics.152  LEOBOR statutes also provide benefits such as 
enforced delays between the act of suspected misconduct and the initiation 
of a police investigation.153  Officers therefore receive a much higher 
standard of pre-trial protections and review than do community members 
suspected of criminal behavior, which bolsters the likelihood that officers 
will not be charged with crimes by prosecutors or indicted by grand juries. 
Further, there are no bright-line rules regarding when an officer is 
justified in employing violence against a civilian.  The legal standards 
regarding police use of force favor the police officer’s perceptions of the 
encounter and the “split-second” decision-making inherent to police work.154  
The focus on the reasonableness of the police officer’s decision to use force, 
a focus which takes into account the officer’s perspective on the danger he 
faced—such as the nature of the neighborhood, the actions of the civilian, 
his feelings of fear, and so forth—frequently results in prosecutors, grand 
juries, and jurors finding that the use of force was justified.155  While criminal 
 
 150  See Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447, 1147–
48 (2016) (arguing that giving prosecutors responsibility for charging and trying police 
officers in the same jurisdiction constitutes an unwaivable conflict of interest).   
 151  See Kate Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745, 750 (2016) 
(describing the type of process prosecutors “tend to give to police suspects, including 
thorough investigation and full evidentiary presentations to well-informed grand juries”).   
 152  Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1224–27 (2016) (discussing 
the protections provided to police by LEOBOR in at least fourteen states in regards to 
interrogation by police, including limitations on the number of officers who can conduct the 
interrogation, the restriction on the use of abusive language and the use of promises as an 
incentive to encourage the officer to speak, and the requirement that questioning take place 
during the day).   
 153  Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An 
Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officer’s Bill of Rights, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 
212 (2005) (discussing the protections provided to police by LEOBOR statutes, including 
enforced delays before investigations can begin).   
 154  See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); 
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).   
 155  See Carbado, supra note 52, at 1518–19 (discussing the ways that the reasonableness 
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convictions of police officers do occur, because police are guarded by 
extensive legal defenses and rarely convicted, a reasonable person could 
have substantial concerns about the criminal law’s deterrent effect on police 
misconduct. 
In addition to this knowledge, a reasonable person could be aware that 
police are also governed by, and may receive additional protections from, a 
multitude of laws that may impact police accountability, such as civil service 
and collective bargaining statutes.156  Perhaps more attenuated from pure 
“knowledge of the law” is the reasonable person’s awareness of possible 
sanctions imposed against wayward police officers by the police department 
itself.  Here, too, the reasonable person would have reason to doubt that the 
possibility of internal police department sanctions serves as an effective 
deterrent to police misconduct.  While police departments have internal 
review procedures in which departments investigate alleged misconduct by 
their own officers, such as civilian complaints, these procedures are critiqued 
as ineffective at best.157  Problems with the systems, as Professor Rachel 
Moran has explained, include the imposition of byzantine requirements for 
the filing of civilian complaints, failure to follow up complaints with 
investigations, investigations in which departments apply high standards of 
proof and a proclivity to believe and support their fellow officers, and an 
unwillingness to impose sanctions on officers, even in cases of serious 
misconduct.158  Independent review agencies, in which police departments 
receive oversight from people or organizations outside of law enforcement, 
do not fare much better, as they are often hampered by issues such as low 
staffing, a lack of access to the evidence needed to meaningfully review the 
case, and the inability to discipline officers found to have acted 
 
doctrine in excessive force cases “translate[s] [police] violence into justifiable force,” and 
noting that in trial “[t]he inquiry is . . . whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position 
would have believed that the use of force was necessary. An officer’s testimony that he/she 
feared for his/her life, that he/she was in a high-crime area, that it was late at night, and that 
he/she thought the suspect had a gun, will often be enough to support the conclusion that the 
officer acted reasonably”); Lawrence Rosenthal, Good and Bad Ways to Address Police 
Violence, 48 URB. LAW. 675, 679–81 (2017) (discussing the ways that state criminal law—
through the provision of a “public authority” defense—and federal criminal law analyze the 
reasonableness of or justification for police violence).   
 156  Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 764, 795–809 
(2012) (addressing “the full web of federal, state, and local laws that govern the police outside 
of the context of criminal investigations,” and arguing that “courts tailor their interpretation 
of § 1983 and the exclusionary rule to encourage changes in police behavior, yet civil service 
law, collective bargaining law, and federal and state employment discrimination law 
simultaneously discourage the same reforms”).   
 157  See, e.g., Moran, supra note 139, at 854, 866–68 (discussing the ways in which 
“[a]llowing officers within the same police department to investigate each other presents a 
variety of problems throughout the entire complaint process, from intake to investigation to 
decision-making and discipline”).   
 158  Moran, supra note 139, at 853–61.   
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wrongfully.159 
A reasonable person with an understanding of the criminal law or 
administrative procedures related to police wrongdoing thus would know 
that the protections afforded the police are derived from multiple legal 
sources, and proving that a police officer violated the law or police codes of 
conduct requires surmounting a variety of complex legal and procedural 
challenges.  A reasonable person with this legal knowledge could then 
rationally conclude that police officers would not be meaningfully deterred 
from committing a wrongful act by fear of the risk of consequences within 
the criminal system or police departments themselves. 
III. LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS RACE CONSCIOUSNESS 
African American people and other people of color have long stated 
that interactions with police are deeply affected both by the fear of police 
misconduct and violence and a belief that such actions, even when 
unprovoked and unwarranted, carry no consequences to the officer.  African 
American scholars, authors, and advocates have described the daily anxiety 
of living in a society in which police misconduct and violence goes 
unchecked and undeterred.160  Under current Fourth Amendment seizure 
jurisprudence, courts do not engage with any aspect of these assertions.  As 
described above, courts evaluating whether an officer had reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause to conduct a stop or seizure do not consider data 
involving police interactions with people of color or even, in most cases, the 
personal bias of the police officer.  Further, the subjective fear of the civilian, 
even if based on specific experiences with the police, falls outside of the 
strict objective approach to the reasonable person standard.  The lived 
experiences of people of color in interactions with the police are not just 
pushed to the margins, but are kept out of the analysis altogether. 
But if courts explicitly assume that both civilians and police officers 
have knowledge of the law that governs interactions between law 
enforcement and members of the community, the marginalized perspective 
of people of color moves toward the center.  This is so because all parties 
with such knowledge would be aware that laws that apply to police 
misconduct —laws that provide few clear limits on police behavior, are 
deferential to police decision-making, and byzantine in their application  –
provide little deterrent influence to those officers who act outside of 
Constitutional and statutory limits.  All people stopped by the police should 
thus be assumed to understand what many African American people have 
 
 159  Id. at 868–82 (describing the reasons that independent review boards are often not an 
effective means of identifying or punishing police misconduct).   
 160  See, e.g., McMurtry-Chubb, supra note 6; DYSON, supra note 6, at 27; OGLETREE, 
supra note 6, at 115–241.   
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long been asking courts—and society as a whole—to recognize: that an 
encounter with the police is one in which police power is largely unchecked. 
A. Knowledge of the Law and the Reasonable Person’s Freedom to 
Terminate a Police Encounter 
Advocates for reform have sought to persuade courts to consider the 
reasonable fear of police misconduct in the seizure analysis by 
demonstrating why failure to do so is dismissive of the racialized reality of 
police encounters.161  African American people may be subjectively aware 
of the lack of legal accountability for police misconduct based on personal 
or community experience, because African American people are statistically 
more likely to experience that misconduct and its racially-influenced 
aftermath.  People of color are far more likely to be stopped by police without 
reasonable suspicion, arrested without probable cause, and be assaulted or 
killed by police than are white people.162  Police shootings of unarmed 
African American people have, on the public stage, remained unindicted by 
grand juries, uncharged by prosecutors, unconvicted by juries, and 
unpunished under the civil law—a phenomenon that Professor Margalynne 
Armstrong has termed “legal impunity for taking Black lives.”163  
Understanding the law surrounding police accountability and how it is or is 
not enforced demands a race-conscious analysis; it is not a ‘race-neutral’ 
body of law just as the Fourth Amendment is not truly a ‘race-neutral’ 
jurisprudence. 
But courts undertaking a Fourth Amendment seizure analysis have, as 
we have seen, explicitly evaded grappling with the implications of race in 
police-civilian encounters. Courts analyzing interactions between the police 
and community members under the Fourth Amendment reasonable person 
standard do not factor in the subjective experiences of the community 
member involved in that encounter, including her knowledge of how such 
encounters are shaped by race. Such knowledge, in the eyes of the judiciary, 
falls outside the boundaries of reasonableness, into a subjective landscape in 
which fear of police wrongdoing is based on individualized experiences that 
have no bearing on what reasonable people think or feel. 
 
 161  See Carbado, supra note 51, at 967–68 (discussing the racial realities of police-civilian 
encounters and the ways that “the Supreme Court’s construction and reification of race in 
Fourth Amendment cases legitimizes and reproduces racial inequality in the context of 
policing”).   
 162  See supra note 3.   
 163  Margalynne J. Armstrong, Are We Nearing the End of Impunity for Taking Black 
Lives?, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 721 (2016) (discussing the history of impunity granted by 
the U.S. legal system to those who killed African American people and reviewing legal 
movements seeking to hold law enforcement officers responsible for disproportionate 
violence against African American people).   
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To dismiss this knowledge as subjective is to acknowledge the 
racialized nature of the law’s enforcement.  That is to say, the judicial 
assumption that a ‘neutral’ reasonable person would not harbor concerns 
about police wrongdoing and the lack of police accountability, because such 
concerns are based on subjective experiences or beliefs that are beyond the 
scope of the objective inquiry, is implicitly based on the recognition that the 
law is influenced by race. Courts do not consider whether a reasonable 
person would be constrained in their freedom to terminate a police encounter 
because of fear of unchecked police wrongdoing because such concerns are 
the subjective fears of people of color. The judicially-created reasonable 
person is thus not race-neutral, but rather is presumptively white.164 
But if courts committed to this race-avoidant approach assume that the 
law applies equally to all people, and thus all reasonable people would have 
an objective working understanding of the applicable law—the assumptions 
that characterize the seizure analysis as it currently stands—than they should 
contend with knowledge of the lack of police accountability under the law 
as an objective factor in the reasonable person test.  This approach changes 
nothing about the reasonable person analysis, but simply places emphasis on 
the relevant legal knowledge that reasonable people in the seizure context 
are already assumed to possess.  For the purposes of the Fourth Amendment 
seizure analysis, the question then becomes: is a reasonable person with this 
knowledge ever free to terminate any encounter with the police? 
A brief walkthrough of a police encounter can illuminate how 
knowledge of the law related to police wrongdoing could implicate the 
seizure analysis.  A police officer approaches a person on the street and asks 
if he can speak with her.  Or stands in front of a bus stopped far from its final 
destination and asks all the passengers for permission to search their 
belongings.  Or walks up to a parked car and asks the person in the passenger 
seat whether he lives in the neighborhood.  Have any of these people been 
seized by law enforcement?  Under the objective reasonable person analysis, 
as we have seen, that depends.  The reasonable person listens to the officer’s 
tone of voice, notes whether he is making requests or demands, looks to see 
if his weapon is holstered or drawn.  She observes whether police officers 
 
 164  See Carpiniello, supra note 33, at 358 (“In our criminal justice system, reasonable 
behavior is defined as White behavior.”).  An argument can also be made that a reasonable 
person is also presumed to be gender-conforming, male, and in other ways lacking a 
marginalized identity that might influence the nature of the police interaction.  See Jesse-
Justin Cuevas & Tonja Jacobi, The Hidden Psychology of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 
37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2198 (2016) (explaining that the objective approach to the 
reasonable person test has resulted in jurisprudence in which “the ‘reasonable person’ is 
actually implicitly white, male, adult, and able-minded. His speech and conduct are treated 
as normal, and the different speech and conduct of women, juveniles, and the intellectually 
disabled is not incorporated into the doctrine”).   
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have blocked her car from moving, locked her in a police car, or told her to 
sit on the curb and stay still.  The hypothetical objective reasonable person 
asks herself whether, in each of these circumstances, she feels free to refuse 
the officer’s requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. 
Perhaps the officer’s weapon is holstered, his tone is friendly, his 
requests seem benign, and the reasonable person, knowing her constitutional 
right to end a consensual police encounter, decides to politely move on.  But 
a reasonable person’s knowledge of the areas of the law addressing police 
accountability frames the encounter, as does knowledge of her constitutional 
rights.  Before deciding whether she is free to terminate the encounter, she 
consults her knowledge of the rest of the relevant law, and she knows the 
police officer must be (at least reasonably) aware of the law as well.  She 
knows that the officer is expected to follow the law and, under the law, it 
appears clear—though, given the murky state of the seizure jurisprudence, 
perhaps not certain—that she is free to terminate the encounter without 
repercussion. 
But even if the reasonable person is not assumed to be familiar with the 
facts of recent well-publicized acts of police violence, in which fairly benign 
situations—a man selling loose cigarettes on the street,165 a stop for a traffic 
violation,166 a child playing with an air gun in a park167—escalated into 
deadly acts by the police within minutes or seconds, she would certainly 
understand that her decision to terminate a police encounter may be a turning 
point in the interaction in which police wrongdoing is a possibility.  If the 
person chooses to refuse the officer’s request or to leave, perhaps the 
particular officer at issue will act wrongfully, perhaps he will not.  But 
knowledge of the relevant law tells her that if she says no to the officer’s 
requests or walks away, and he wrongfully grabs her, or shoots her, or arrests 
her, both he and she are aware that the likelihood of any legal or personal 
ramifications to that officer are vanishingly remote.  This legal frame, more 
so than the friendliness of the officer’s tone or whether the lights in the squad 
car were activated, arguably provides her with an accurate understanding of 
the freedom she possesses to terminate the interaction. 
A reasonable person with a knowledge of the law would only feel free 
to leave if the circumstances of the encounter indicate that the encounter is 
consensual and the reasonable person assumes that the police will not react 
wrongfully even in the absence of legal consequences for doing so.  Nothing 
 
 165  Al Baker, J. David Goodman & Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the Chokehold: The Path 
to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/
14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html?mcubz=0 (describing police 
choking Eric Garner to death after contacting him for selling loose cigarettes).   
 166  Smith, supra note 4.   
 167  Ohlheiser, supra note 4.   
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in the substance of the law merits that assumption, as noted above; people 
feel secure in their ability to leave a police interaction because of social 
privileges that are unspoken in the law itself.  Without acknowledgement of 
those privileges, all reasonable people would know that police misconduct is 
not reliably deterred by the law, and thus all reasonable people would believe 
they are at risk of unchecked police misconduct if they assert their 
constitutional rights.  An interaction with the police in which law 
enforcement can act wrongfully without meaningful fear of consequences is 
not one that a reasonable person is free to terminate.  A person continuing 
the interaction is not doing so voluntarily, but rather in reaction to the 
coercion and intimidation inherent to interacting with a person with 
unchecked power.168  Under the objective reasonable person test, knowledge 
of the law governing police accountability constrains the freedom of all 
reasonable people to terminate a police encounter, and thus arguably all 
police-civilian interactions are seizures demanding Fourth Amendment 
protections. 
B. The Limitations of Legal Knowledge as a Route to Expansion of 
the Seizure Analysis and as an Agent of Change in Police-
Civilian Interactions 
An emphasis on the reasonable person’s knowledge of the law 
surrounding police misconduct is not, however, a guaranteed pathway to an 
expanded seizure analysis.  There are a variety of ways that courts could 
avoid the conclusion that knowledge of the law regarding police wrongdoing 
has implications in the seizure context.  Courts could find that reasonable 
people are free to terminate encounters with the police based on the objective 
facts of those encounters, notwithstanding the question of the probability of 
legal consequences for law enforcement misconduct.169  Judges may be 
convinced that police officers are held accountable by the law and thus 
unpersuaded that a reasonable person would have an objective, law-based 
reason to be concerned about officer wrongdoing.  Some courts might 
conclude that police officers do not commit legal transgressions with enough 
regularity to cause a reasonable person alarm, even if such misconduct is not 
significantly deterred by the law.  Other judges may acknowledge that the 
police officers commit misconduct, acknowledge that such misconduct is not 
always deterred by the legal system, but feel that law-abiding citizens are not 
 
 168  Even under the current state of the law, the Supreme Court recognizes that if a person 
is simply submitting to a show of police authority the encounter is not a consensual one.  See 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548–49 (1968) (holding that a person’s consent to 
search is not voluntary if it resulted from “acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority”).   
 169  Ross, supra note 50, at 340–41 (discussing the perspective that because the reasonable 
person standard is a legal fiction, the Supreme Court will not be persuaded to change it even 
in the face of empirical evidence).   
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the targets of such behavior, and thus a reasonable, innocent person would 
have no cause to consider police wrongdoing when determining whether he 
is free to terminate a police encounter. 
But for courts who take knowledge of the lack of police accountability 
seriously, mindful incorporation of that knowledge as an objective factor in 
the reasonable person test could shift the seizure analysis such that most, if 
not all, interactions with the police could constitute seizures for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.  This approach may bring the Fourth Amendment 
seizure analysis into greater alignment with the realities of police encounters 
that people of color have been asserting for years.  Yet if courts find that 
knowledge of the lack of meaningful deterrence to police misconduct 
transforms police encounters into seizures, the implications regarding Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, police behavior, and legal outcomes in criminal 
and civil cases remain undetermined.  Some might view the incorporation of 
legal knowledge of the law surrounding police accountability into the 
reasonable person standard as effecting too much change and too much 
constraint on police actions; others might view it as providing little to none 
of both. 
If courts more regularly find that civilian encounters with police 
constitute seizures, police officers and others may fear that that this change 
will constrain law enforcement from engaging with the public and over-deter 
police officers from conducting investigations.  If police cannot interact with 
civilians without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, these critics might 
argue, they will not be able to build community ties through informal 
encounters or gain information from casual interactions with people on the 
street.  Detractors might also contend that this approach could provide 
greater legal cover to people violating the law.  People charged with crimes 
could, for example, more easily seek to suppress evidence based on the 
argument that the police contact constituted a seizure from its outset, and 
thus the officer must possess reasonable suspicion or probable cause at an 
earlier point in the encounter than the law currently requires.  These and other 
concerns have been leveled against Fourth Amendment seizure 
jurisprudence as it stands, and would be heightened by expansion of the 
circumstances in which courts acknowledge seizures to have occurred. 
These possible reactions are all based on the assumption that if courts 
recognize police-civilian encounters as seizures, such a recognition would 
bring about a change in police behavior and in the consequences of police 
actions.  Yet even those who would applaud such changes might wonder 
whether an increased recognition of police encounters as seizures would 
instigate any change in police encounters with the public.  The analysis 
proposed here posits that if a reasonable person is aware that the law does 
not meaningfully deter police misconduct, that person is less free to 
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terminate a police encounter, and thus courts recognizing such knowledge 
must necessarily determine that a seizure has occurred.  But it is the very 
lack of consequences to police that informs this seizure analysis, so even in 
a world in which courts more readily identify police-civilian interactions as 
seizures, there are still no meaningful constraints preventing officers from 
violating the law.  Even advocates for the incorporation of explicit 
knowledge regarding police misconduct into the reasonable person standard 
might question whether this recognition would bring about substantial 
change in the legal system or play a role in deterring police wrongdoing 
against people of color. 
C. The Merits of Addressing Legal Knowledge in the Seizure 
Analysis 
There is nevertheless merit in requiring courts to contend with the 
implications of a reasonable person’s knowledge of the law surrounding 
police accountability.  The increased attention to the law addressing police 
wrongdoing may have positive long-term benefits for those seeking to 
anchor judicial decision-making in legal and factual realities and for those 
seeking to increase police accountability under the law.Explicit 
incorporation of knowledge of the law related to police conduct would 
encourage courts to explore the remedies that shape the right in the Fourth 
Amendment seizure context.  The focus on the nature of the law and its 
application could help push courts towards a greater understanding of the 
realities of police-civilian interactions and their aftermath, and thus serve as 
a pathway to a more racially realistic Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
For example, if courts found that the lack of legal deterrence to police 
wrongdoing did affect the reasonable person’s freedom to terminate a police 
encounter, an increase in the number of seizure determinations would be a 
significant legal disruption in a system in which courts have become 
accustomed to viewing a wide range of police-civilian interactions as 
consensual encounters.  Even if judicial recognition of police-civilian 
encounters as seizures did not bring about immediate changes in police 
behavior, this disruption in the status quo could be an impetus for lawyers, 
legislators, and judges to address the lack of police accountability under the 
law.  This is so because if there were meaningful constraints imposed on 
police misconduct, the reasonable person would have a basis to believe that 
police would comply with the law.  Knowledge of the law would thus not be 
a factor that limits a reasonable person’s freedom to terminate an encounter 
with the police, thereby returning the seizure analysis to its current focus: the 
objective factors of the police encounter.  Those persons committed to the 
seizure analysis as it stands could therefore be incentivized to seek reform of 
the law surrounding police wrongdoing.  Such changes, while not focused 
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specifically on the racial implications of that wrongdoing and the 
consequences imposed, could nevertheless be of benefit to the communities 
of color impacted by police misconduct. 
Acknowledgement of the significance of the knowledge of the law 
regarding police accountability in the Fourth Amendment seizure analysis 
could spill out into other contexts.  Under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
related to searches, for example, the fact that the police did not have probable 
cause to justify a search of a person or property (or a warrant based on 
probable cause) does not render the search unconstitutional if the person 
voluntary consented to the search.170  Officers are not required to inform the 
person of his right to refuse consent—although jurisdictions often rely on 
written consent forms that do provide acknowledgement of those rights171—
but a consent that was obtained through duress or coercion cannot be 
voluntary.172  If courts assume that people who agree to such searches are 
aware of the lack of legal accountability for police officer misconduct, they 
may conclude that all such searches are inherently coercive and thus no 
consent is truly voluntary.173  The loss or restriction of the consent option 
would drastically transform the landscape of police searches.  Implications 
for other areas of the law, such as the voluntariness of a suspect’s waiver of 
his right to counsel when in police custody,174 while beyond the scope of this 
Article, might also push courts and others to engage with questions of race 
and police accountability that have widely been ignored in judicial analysis 
of interactions between law enforcement and the community. 
There is also merit in requiring courts to engage with the racial 
assumptions that underlie the reasonable person standard.  Scholars and 
advocates have long implored judges to understand that a reasonable person 
would not feel free to terminate a police encounter if that person knows that 
her race places her at greater risk of harm and that the legal system provides 
few deterrents to police inflicting harm upon her.  The approach advocated 
 
 170  The question of voluntariness of consent requires consideration of the totality of the 
circumstances.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).  In Schneckloth and 
subsequent cases, the Court considered both subjective and objective factors, up to and 
including evaluating the significance of race in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 
(1980).  In recent years, however, the Court has focused solely on objective factors.  See 
Nancy Leong & Kira Suyeishi, Consent Forms and Consent Formalism, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 
751 (2013) for an overview of the consent law doctrine.   
 171  See Leong & Suyeishi, supra note 170.   
 172  Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550 (“Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.”).   
 173  It is unclear, however, whether people who consent to searches are actually assumed 
to have knowledge of the law, or whether such knowledge simply is not dispositive of the 
consent question.  In either case, courts could avoid grappling with knowledge of the relevant 
law related to police accountability in the consent context by asserting that it is not an essential 
aspect of the totality of the circumstances test as it currently stands.   
 174  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).   
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in this Article seeks to engage courts in an exercise in racial empathy175 by 
requiring them to contend with the lack of police accountability as an issue 
of consequence to the fictional reasonable person.  Courts cannot as easily 
sidestep the lack of police accountability under the law as a subjective 
concern of marginalized groups without acknowledging the very racial 
dynamics they seek to ignore.  This approach thus requires courts to view the 
world through the eyes of a person who knows that the risk of police 
wrongdoing is both real and unconstrained by the law, and ask whether that 
person enjoys any meaningful freedom to terminate a police encounter.  
While this is a far cry from true understanding of the racial dynamics of our 
society, police-community relations, and our legal system, it could move 
courts who have otherwise ignored those dynamics altogether towards a 
greater understanding of the experiences of people of color and their 
interactions with the police. 
CONCLUSION 
The approach to the seizure analysis outlined in this Article is not 
intended to obfuscate the realities of our society’s racial history or the 
realities of the racially disparate impact of police misconduct.  It certainly 
does not stand for the proposition that ‘race-neutrality’ is the pathway to 
racial justice in the seizure context or elsewhere.  Rather, it seeks to flip the 
role of race-avoidance in the seizure analysis, so that rather than ignoring 
racial realities, courts are required to engage with the lack of legal deterrents 
to police misconduct as an issue of concern to all reasonable people, not one 
that people of color alone are expected to endure. 
 
 
 175  I do not by this statement mean to imply that all judges are white, or that no judges 
have had negative encounters with the police, or that African American or other judges of 
color would share a uniform view of the police and their interactions with members of the 
community.  None of these things are true; however, it is accurate to state the majority of 
judges, both federal and state, are white men who have not shared the lived experiences of 
people of color in the United States.  See Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Gavel 
Gap: Who Sits in Judgement on State Courts?, AM. CONST. SOC. FOR L. & POL’Y 7 (2016), 
http://gavelgap.org/pdf/gavel-gap-report.pdf (finding that more than half of state trial and 
appellate judges are white men, despite the fact that white men make up only 30% of the 
population); Jonathan K. Stubbs, A Demographic History of Federal Judicial Appointments 
by Sex and Race: 1789-2016, 26 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 92, 115 (2016) (finding that a little 
more than 60% of sitting federal judges are white males).   
